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PREFACE
to whof moy b# h it greote# Fobb Flow## r#«orcbci the bom
rort o f wor lougbf In fho #%W ëWomloo. Gomrolw o0O#ot$ otWMoo to tb# o f- 
foo ti o f wor oooe romovW from fmrtoool oowb#. Its sibtools ore tbe v b tW , 
ilvlo@ ood émAg o f bombordmeot from tbe o fr, Tbi^ ore soldier, elvlllom  «md 
beosb-«oH ooogbt too ther In one momeot o f ooovulsed ogooy, eoW% oe#rleloosly 
fotod by tbe oeoldeoN o f fhm  cmd poeltbm.
Tbe bombif^  of Goermloo In of wo# on evemt io tb# Sponlsb 
Civil W or«^ l#o  w bl# telexed rigbtiit forci» of Germmy ood Itoly w#e
tent to to# iwwly ^ l# e d  #rote@le# ood toctlcs. Tbe sovogery of tbe ottock érew 
world-wide protest beoowe of tbe probdily well^ ^feoficM ^mplclom tb# tbe Ger- 
mo*» Intended the opersdlon to serve os o oltniool smperlment ediieh would dbr 
close tbe effects of o beovy ofr ossoult o#oW  on essentlolly non-mllitory db|ec-* 
live*
Two yeors bter, with tbe onset of World Wor II, bomAls# of non* 
combotonts woi to become o routine ^sersebm, but cm ^^erotion tbot nevertheless 
rolsed emotional #orms of #eot Intewlty# Todoy tbe Issue, for from hovli^ sub­
sided, is control «
There Is o consemu# omm  ^mllltory bWorks» tbot the str#eglc oir 
offemlve c^ lm t Gmrmony wos o decisive footer In the ultlmote vletmry of the 
All I## Thm^ e bos not been, nor perbops w ill there ever be, o oorreepondlng 
unmlmlty which ensigns o meenurdsle weight or value to tbe port ployed by this
mw method of worlore. A)thowÿ% nummrout mwmsme#* hove been ewde, none 1$ 
msneluslve.
ThSft #udy wlH enomine the itrotegio oh o#en#lve egoW t Germcmy 
w ilhk i the brood eontext o f A llied wor oimt ond Hie Him p re vo lll#  m llltory doe- 
trine#. Em^ phosl# w ill ee#er mo|or obstcmlei thot stood In the woy of I»  
gre#m  oWilevemmt. No #tem pt w ill be mode to cbwrlbe or omen the opero- 
tionoi copeoti o f the bonding oompol#% eonduoted by Hie B ritkh ond Amerleon 
forces. SW* m  ottempt would be prmweptuous In the foee of the superb o ^ o io l 
ehronlole# thot ore now enrolhable to s#lsfy the mo# seorWiIng Imprlrles. F lnolly, 
OS the result o f my endeovon, I hope to drow some gmerol oonoluslons thot hove 
relevonoe to the #r#egio proem s o f todoy.
For the InspW lon underlying this study I owe o debt o f grotltucb to 
Doctor A . Stonley Triehett, O m m m  g Deportment o f MlWory, Ih ilve rilty  o f Omohe, 
who fought me to ovoid o i^ wmomenolWlc reoding o f hWory emd to seek for truth 
bemeoth the wWs o f Inek^H , ¥m the produ#lon o f the p#mr I mu# thmdc my 
w ife , M o ri^y  Feters M w . It wos sW who, w ith msnslderdsle h w l^ t ond tact, 
applied the goods th #  moved uni from oontempWlon to o ctlv lty ,
RomT M, mm
June 1965
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CHAPTER i 
INTRODUCTION 
Before beeoming toe deeply rnieemed w ith a portW ler feeet o f mm 
portteyler wm, It I# useful to re flect, If only b rie fly , upon the sub|ect of wor It­
self, W ithout some b^lm #l%  p h llo K ^ lcc il bosk to old In estobllshlng o per#>ee- 
tive , no worthwhile purpose would be swved by dredgh^ up portlm s o f whet Is 
olreody tWroughly doeumentW history,
Ww os o soclol phsmomenon Is utuolly thought to hove o nolure th #
Is eithm  ro tbno llstlc or ^ te n n ln is tlc , CTi the one hond, thwe who occ#pt the 
rotlonollst view believe that wor Is o emstt# of choice or decision. Someone, or 
some #oup of people, consciously ond w illin g ly  choos# ergon Iced violence os e 
way o f relieving tenslom or redressing wrongs* On the other hond, those fovorlng 
o determ In 1st m^lcmotlon oHer such vorled su(we#low fmr the couses W wor os the 
ementlolly o@^#slve noture of monklndi &e cycllool economic p#tems which re­
sult in motor lo i é ^ lvo tlo n »  ond, hence, cm unrestrolned ocgulsltlveness on the 
port ^  the d#*#sed peopW# or even the scorch of surplio copltol fm  new outlets, 
thus leodtng to te rrito rlo l e r^ lo lto tlm  cmd oolonlollst mpomlon.
W ithout ottemptIng to orgue the vo lld ity  elHier of the two theories,
le t It suffice to soy thot, for this study, o rotlonollst wmdructlon ^  ww w ill be 
understood, m d hirthmr, thot the embed Imont o f this port leu lor viewpoint Is con­
tained In the wrItirMa of Karl von Clousewltx*
If the prt^ sosltlon o f Clousewltz con be reodlly occepteé—thot **wor
1
h  only o comtlmmtWn o f Sf#o policy by other meccw,*^ then tome relevant de­
duction# eon be drown from gè#ervl% the bchovlor o f n o tio n -# # #  In World Wor 
II. One o f th#e observotlon# is fh #  the H itler Ion exponslonist progrom wos o 
nWem archetype o f the Clwmewitzion mcetlm. The fsmlle tron#brm #W  o f the 
N otW ol Soclol I#  revolution Into o pmpo#hit scheme o f extemol wnque# ww 
m<mlfe#ly on exomple #  how m  outhorltorlon govwnment con force Hie progres­
sion o f po litlco l oc tiv ity  from the non-vlole# end of the ^ectrum  to the v io im t 
w itW ut, In the process, developing momlve reslstmce w ith in the pc^lo#» .
Another obterv#ion cpiite In contro# w ith Hie Gwmon mcomple Is 
thot the expwlwice of the A ll I# , while confonning to ClousewitE* Hieory in out­
line , was nottble n#  for Its conformity to the theory but for the tempe^wus 
omblvolence gpMwr#ed In the movement frmn pence to wor. There Is no evidence 
to diow th # , before the wor, ony of the A llied  governments, elHisr secretly or 
oHierwise, hod foreign policies thot were #%pesslvely # ient#d, Onom^ently# 
when confronted w ith the need to figh t to preserve pence, m  emottonol crisis 
orose omong tlm people because the only ovemie open to co#inue st#e policy 
wm one by definition m ntrory to the p o lii^  itse lf. This wos si#» lfim ntly d *ff# m t
 1   -------------------------
Quoted in J .F .C  Fuller, iMw C ondi# 1789-1^1
(New Bruiowtek, New j##ey$ Rutgers iSÈnlverïlîy"F ^ p ." l^ .
2How Hiis wos done ww b rillkm tly  oqsosed hy Hermorm Rmischning 
who troced the ideologicol mochln#ions of the N#*onol Soclolisb from the 
beginnings to the then prwent (Moy, 193^, ond foretold w ith omoxing occurwy 
Hm o#o#fophic events thot followed. See TW Revolution of N ihllbm t A Wom- 
ina to the W e#, trm s. E. W. D ick# ^ s wm
7 if? r
from the situation ins Wo Gotmmy wh#o moss p^#iologtool conditioning of tho 
eltlxonry omwred the oontinulty of stote policy in the C ornel d#lrod by the Noxi 
hierorehy.
The problem of the A llied  ^e m m m #  then beeome one of motivoting 
the people, wk» were not os attuned to the demger* o f fooism os were their leaders* 
This task, that o f r#-# ienting the emotional sub-sfruelure of a pc^ le tio n  into new 
cmd unfamtlke wsys, wos not m  easy one*
In W or to oopture the enthusiosm of the people, emee war was upon them, 
it be#me wcessory to oompemete for the aversion to violenoe, suboonseioim or 
not, w ith a stimulus aao#»tdble to the Judeo-Chrlstiim ethle, A new mystique 
hod to be erecOed md new goals identified* This fdtenonienon, related m gew rolly 
non-#»eetfie tmmts to the Am# Wen experienw, has been deemrsbed by e oo#%tem»»o- 
rory po litloo l so lent W*
The mctremiim of the Amer loon doctrine In refusing to oountmonoe 
the use o f foree rmes^t in vmy lim ited elreumstwwes olWws the pmidulimi 
to sw e^ for in the ^ p # tte  direct Ion ones fore» is undertokm rW emlvely 
s#aW  s^ession* TW  Is, whm fors» fin a lly  is resorted to . It #eks vmy 
large aims—ok» w h id i, prior to the r# e rt to force, w #e regordbd os ob­
tainable only by peoce&l mecm. The psyehologiool attitude w hl#t pom Its 
policy mctrem# to be pursued In a de fm lve  war that could not be purwed 
by peaceful means Is i^ fo u s ly  m  o ttltu ^  o f vmgeonw that is more thm  
o little  reminiscent o f the rightewm postmre o f the medieval wonrior, who 
may hove mode war more botbaraus thro i^ h his oonvlctlon that he atone 
fm ^ t for a just cause. We hove noted before the d lffic u lti#  Inherent in
^In America, where the feeling against war was the greotmt, the work 
o f conversion was nmde eosi# by having b s ^  tlie  ob|ect o f direct attack, which 
generated a npontoneous sense of great outrage.
showily toteronce toward the memy when on# Is convinood that th# #%#my's 
oouse is to ta lly  utifust. As to th# ^o rie a n  attltudo, th# Qwwtiom W mod» 
that " It Is d iffic u lt not to conclude that this doctrine p\mm  almost no w b- 
stmitive lim its upon the specific objectives which may legitim ately be sought 
once Wee is employed in cbfense ogolnst s»$pession. " Wor Is to be wr^ed, 
mce It has be#% tb r ^  upon the notW , urn il the enemy surrenders uncon­
d itiona lly m the entire world has been mode safe for democracy* ^
The war aims #  the b e lll^ e n ts  gfm t out o f the philosc^hicol underpin­
nings of their governments* On both sides the aims were ideological and hortatory, 
which, m  w ill be dismissed later, hod r^rcw ssive effects t^ son the m ilitary stra­
te g ic  adopted by each.
The lo i^ -ronge aim o f the Norn is was thus described by Rouschningi
The w sm tiol aim is #epwech%ess, w ith the d#enninatlon to pudi onwards 
cmd mnerge from central Européen contimmtol confinem#its cm unscrupulous, 
cbctrineless determinat icm to seize enythU^ and to be reocb to do m yth ing 
that smrv# the increme of power and dominion. It is a eoncpiistador pot icy 
. . . .  The aim o f this foreign policy is the revolutionmy 'redW #ution of 
the world mW erecthm #  m Ommm Gmssrmm, In which everyone w ill Wve 
o shore, and the wealth o f which w llî olfS™vïïy dlfferrm t prospech from 
those o f dwring out o f poor little  poverty-strickmn Oermceiy, which conmrt 
be mode cmy lorgmr by d iv ld lr^  it  up. Notional Socialism discovers many 
pretexts for its po litica l actions; but behind them a ll stands, plain for a ll to 
see, the n ih lti#  revolution.^
The aims of the A llies wwre more reactive and short-ror^ed than tW ^  o f 
their < f^^ >on#its m â were formed w ith in the context o f the Western liberal trcxii- 
tion.
A ll Wwtern nationsmre heavily Influenced by Hie humcme ideals of 
Christianity, the Enlightenment, Hie scientific revolution, and from these
4.ynn H. M ille r, "The Doctrine o f Ju# W ar," World Politics, XVI 
(Jonuwy, 1964, P* 266.
% #W m lng, c it . , pp. 263 m d 266,
üfid other influemc# the fibere! trod ltio ii has been distlMed. As for os 
W eîjpi policy \$ ecmcerned the most Importent rw u lt o f liberalism has 
been the dlmoolotion of power end po licy. Liberalism #sw »# tW  a ll 
states ##  eqwoMy intereeted in poem, tW  foroe end power politic#' ore 
always to h@ deprecated in intern#Im el relations, m d that the conflict­
ing policies o f countries mW pow# groiqss cm  u tm lly  be hwmmised by 
the some m#mm that govern Internal domestic di##m ces—due proce», 
reason, cmmon smse, elementary morality end institutions such os the 
United Nations. Ww on the o th#  hond 1$ a completely d ifr#ent tt# e  
of m (i#wce to peace, on cberration, emd It ism m iy  be justified when 
fought 08 0 #usode ogoifWt tyrants in o mood of rtghteoio indigpicdion.
Thwi, mcoclnwm force must be used to smd the conflict os ^ ic k ly  os pw* 
sible, and so total wars W ght by democracies ^ ic k ly  take on m  i<hio- 
logica! chw w ter. . . ,
No better illustration of the foregping conciW ^  democracy at war can 
be found than in the stoteme# of W iit#on S. Churchill In his speech to the House 
of Commons, which hod been simmtmed to register a vote of confidence in his new 
govermnmitt
You c»k, whet is our policy? I w ill sc^i It is to wage war, by sec,
Icmd, and a ir, w ith a ll our might and w ith e ll the stre*%th that God ccsn 
give us# to war ogolfwt o immstrous tyrormy, never surpowW in the 
d#k, Immmtsèle cafo lo^e o f humcm orlme. That is o #  po licy. You 
ask, V ^ot if  our aim? I tm  smswer in one word# Victory—victory at 
a ll costs, victory m qplte of a ll twrror; victory, however b i^  and hard 
the rood may be; for without victory, there is no w rv ivo l. L#  that be 
realised; no survival for the British &nplre; no survival for a ll that the 
British Dnplre has stood for, no survival for the and inculte o f the 
ages, that mankind w ill move forwwd toward Its goal. But I toko op my 
t ^  w ith buoywcy cmd I feel wre that cmr ^sise w ill not be
suffered to fo il among men. A t this time I bet entitled to claim Hie aid 
o f o il, and I soy, "Come, them, le t us go forward together w ith our united 
strength."^
^Dovid Rees, Koreo# The Limited War (New York: St. M artin's Frwe, 
1944, P* x l.
^Winston S. O iu rch lll, The Second Wmrld W ig, V o l. Hi Their Finest 
Hm^ {Bostons Houghton M lHIm This wS'fKsTÿW ch
ÏÏÎTRVay 1941) In which the Frime M inister offerW  his countrymen n#hl%  "but 
blood, to il, bars #md sweat. "
W ith such b irring wcrcb m  c persistent bocbfrop fm  their combined efforts, 
there Is no reason to suppose thot the A llies would hove agreed upon any other terms 
for the cessation o f h ^ tilltle s  than "unccmdlttonal surrender.” A ltbot^h Freslcbnt 
Frm klln D# Roosevelt was somewhat #f-hm ded d»out the policy declaration at the 
Casablanca Conference o f January, 1943, it  is evident that the m att# o f kam the 
war would W teffn!n#ed hod been a subject of serious deliberation. Among the 
notes corriW  by Roosevelt to the prem cW erm ce where the "unconditional w r- 
render” policy mm announced was this parc^pcphg
The President cmd the Prime M inister, after a complete swvey of 
world war situation, are more tWn ever <btmrmlned that peace can cmne 
to Hie world only by a total ellm lnotion o f Oefsisan and Jsqxmese war 
power. This involves the s t^ le  formula of placlt^t the objecHve of this 
wmr in terms of an unconditional surremWr by Omrmany, Ita ly  and Jopmi* 
Unconditional surrender by tiiem means a reasmable assimmce o f world 
peace, fm generatiom. Unconditional wrrend#^ means not the destruc­
tion of the Ommm ^pu lace , nor o f the I to) ion or Japwme p t^ la c e , 
but éom mean the destruction of a philoiOfHiy in Germmy, Ita ly  cmd 
Japan which is bcaed on the cor»pest cmd sub{ugatlon o f other peoplw.®
According to some tho u^tfu l obsmrv##. Hie dictum of the A llies carried 
w ith in it m t m \y  grave in ^ liW lw a  for the prosecuting of the war, W t, indeed, 
nothing less than the seeds o f future wmr.
The only |ust#fic#ion o f the Western stotemnen % that their conduct 
o f Hie war wca diaractw lstic of democrcmies of our ogei they submitted 
pamivety to the dynamism of h y i^b o tic  war. They prqpc^ted Hie sim- 
p lw  and mmt convincing of myths* the United Natlmw were the hwbingem 
of A j# lce , the enemy was the incam#len of E vil. In^ipdbie of th in k ii^  
cdiout p^m e, which comm after war and Is its real purpwe, urd il the end
% obwt E. Sherwood, Roosevelt m d Hopkins* An Intimate
Vol. lit Prom Pemrl HoHtor to Y i c t w ' y  Bantam
pp. 3 0 1 -m -----------^ ^
o f the dW ruction, they leodb no ^ o r t to ollm ote the Gmwon people from 
the H itl#  clique md took no précaution# #^ln # t their o ily , wW e ombltlor» 
were Nedly more of o mystery them those o f H itle r. By the time the Illusions 
o f pm^mgowW were dlsslpWed cmd the #sv#nment$ In London end W w h l^o n  
had the m^^sort o f fx ib lic  opinion in thek w ill to resist, the rewcrds o f victory 
hod been lost# EoHem Europe wm $ovi#ti%ed, Germmy divided, md the 
Chinese Communists armed ^  oourt#y of Hie Rus^m ^m y. The Second 
World War hod lo id the burWotions for #ie th ird .^
Be^sise the @W o f # n#lom at war m nfro! the momer in which the wor 
is fought. It follows th #  If fw it ccm be feuW w ith the erne, $u#lcion I# then oast 
upon the #her. In no imtonoe ho# this been more shosply fowssed then in the 
$ till-he#ed controversy over the a ir #t@cks upm non-oomb#«mts d u ri^  World 
War II. I f,  os Aren suggests, m ecm ln^l effort diould Iwve bem mekb to turn 
the Gem»m pe#»le ogoinst their leodmr, then the notmre of the bottle waged 
e ^ in s t them bears re-exa»iin#ion.
Hie fo llo w if^  choptem w ill W concm W  with one of the w ^s  by W iich 
the A ll led war lessors mtt\oé the b # tle  to the homeland of Gwnony. This method 
of worfore—the str#eg*c bon^xsrdment o f cities—was uncbrtcdom f#  three receoms 
(I) H itler hod used it fir# ; 0  it was a way <# #rlkk»} at the mvmy while the 
ground forces were strengthwied cmd readied for en#a#mnent; 0  the war aln» o i 
the A llies were non-restrl#ive cmd, esceept for the terms of surrender, indefinite.
O te hce mdy to know the #iocki#% deWils o f the rai«b upon Coveidry, 
Hmnburg and Dresden to under#and th #  a save# cmd utterly conclusive tetdm^ue 
hod been found to aid man in his melm^holy drift toward self-destruction. And
%aymond Aron, The Cmtury of Total W # (New York# Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1954, p« "55. ' ‘ ' '..... ' '.......
8yet, d i^ îtô  its ebvWu# pmmWe, It w #  m method of worfore used by neither slife
to the lim its o f its p # m tie !. the mWeovor of this #udy w ill be to desmrtbe the
ÎÔmcsiy eonstroints th #  c*#ed upon the A ll led bomber forees* Some o f these were 
oirmmmtmtiol# shortc^es of men cmd equipment, Ine^erlenee, tW m ologieel in - 
odecpmeles, m d o fmsk o f wsentWl infonn#ion ^ « n c rlly  m ilita ry l#e l!lgeno4* 
Others were bW w 1eristie—doctrinal pre|udioe, #m tegic rig id ity , ono lytiw l error, 
m d ethical m nditlm lrq;* A fter a brie f prelude to s tro t^ lo  be^eW m nt In the 
form o f oopsuWed p in ions on the sdb|eet, eoWi of Hie omWrolnts mentioned above 
w ill be addressed, some In ewre detail than others. F W IIy , whatever eonstrue- 
tive  Im em  this inve# tl# tbn  may s u ^ ^ t w ill be o#ered for e ritiee l evaluation.
erpolly ln#ru#lve analysis oould be done using the Gormm 
Lufrw@#e os the subfmt. Such a sWdy would reveal a ewrked o^emeetry bWween 
the two # ts  o f fdetort regelating the A llied  ond German #r#eg$es.
C H A rriR îi 
CO NaîCTINO  CHINIONS 
The Hme îs p#hc# et h#W when (w%me«*# m  the itfo tegtef eeqtbyed 
m World Wor II &m be foneed w ith on #»{eotîvlty mWIng from pronowncemmt# 
mode Ifi the oftwmoth of the war. Hten c t^nicMw w #e fmmed w ith the heot o f the 
ooiHliot s till tenqw rii^  iW ivIduoI blases. Vcrious arguments were supported wlHi 
the vigpr thot ecm only com© from pmrtlc%^*on in the events o f the ttaie. New# 
however# greotmr re fle # iv lty  Is pwslble; time hos broodened perspectives end the 
developmmt o f on historlm l Htwcdure Ws tmded to synHmize heretofore w ire- 
loted facts into o dewier vnderstondlr% o f Hie evw it m  it  reotty oceunred*
On© imue which gave rise (éxrti^ end after Hie ww) to shcrp disagree- 
mmits among A llied  str#egists ond m ilitary theorists was that of the effe#lvwess 
of the strategic o ir Wfenslve ago in# Gemwmy.  ^ The bo#Rbli% of #>|ectives for 
bdiind# omi d irectly ynreloted to# the bottle lines mptmmdoé o rodteol excurslm 
from clossicol m llltory tcmtlcs. Extreme c lo W  on the port o f Its o(#iermts ond 
#»ponen*s d ike  served to isolot© the orgwment ftom reo lity ond to megger#© Its 
slgniftconoe over ond cbove the true re lo tkxd ilp  o f o pest to Its whole# Opiniom 
genwolly followed troditlonol service lines olthowgh# os w ill be seem# e%c#*tlom 
were to be found, Even w ith in the o ir service thwe were thwe opposed to the new
^The #rotegic o ir offensive r^sresmted the efforts c f the Cond l^ned 
Bomber Offem lve n ^ in #  Ommonyi the concmted actions of the Royal A ir Form 
Bond)#r Cemmmd md the United St#es Strategic A ir Forms In Europe#
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doefrlme# but far r#m#w dliftlm ifar to the view# of their edleogue# in other ser­
vices.
Among the severest critics o f the beWsIng $ tr# ^y  wcs Admlial Sir 
Gerald DIckem of the ir lt ld i Royet Novy. W riting offer the war In a polite W  
rmolute attack upon the theories of M ordxil of the R « ^l A ir Fwce Sir Arthur 
tfrHTls, wcrtime A ir 0 # lce r Coiiwi«mdtng-ln-Oi1ef# Bomber GoRmomd# Acbstroi 
Dickens qumtioned both the m illtm y value and the ethical basis o f the Royal A ir
Force booAer offm slve ^hich# of coixie. Implied a smiilar criticism  o f Amerlocm
2#m tegy).
His thesis, on the m llltw y sids, alleged violation #  two rather #re lght- 
fmword maxim . The firs t, m cw db^ to Sir Gerald, ww the wrongful neglect o f 
the meed to meure "v ita l minimum security* ** Because Britain was prim m lly o marl* 
time power, the d@#tru#ion of Gmmw mipowwr—especially the oAmorlne threat- 
should hove been ehesen m the strategic key#one. Hcwever, insteW o f m okl^ 
direct ottodm on the U-boat menace, the weight o f the ovalldble s trlk ii^  force 
was directed to submarine production fo c llltl# #  pediqpf of long-term be iw fit, W t 
certainly not m  kmedlote cmswer to the #rar^ #I$%g d#Mred#lons of the Gemwm 
raiders*^
A»oci#ed w ith the failure to put fir#  thirqgs fir#  mm the (toporture from 
the principle o f "ob|eatlve" wherein a ll fwcm  are united In the pum iit of a
^Gwald D ick#», Bombii»i emd S tn # w : The Fallacy o f Total War 
Owondom Sompeon le w , MorWon & C o., Id j. , ' '
% W ., pp. 1^25 .
l î
endeavor. Admiral Dickens oomsldorad that #%# e fW s o f H&e A ir Faroe 
wore preod over a nw ilrîplîalfy o f W m , but w # , for eoë%# ImuW ale# *trw # h  
to gain mo#ery over any one of #hem* In portlaular he decried whol he Ihooght
to he o lock of coordination cmd Integration of planning w ith the British Army cmd 
Navy. This defleleney In picaming had the é to l effe## of# on the one hcmd, on 
uneconomical use o f o ir power, and on the oHier, a mMt-ovailobîlîty o f o ir support 
when (md where it wos meded by the ofhw servie#. ^
)^ w t from purely m ilitary foctors, etolcol cmd m #el ob|ectWm to the 
strategic o ir o^mwlve w #e raised by Sir Gerald. #1$ #îtîque of the $ tr# # y  in­
voked m dl#!nctlon between wh# w #  the principal and whot the occeseory. In 
plead(1% frv prop# recognition cH mds cmd moms, he branded the wholeeote de­
struction cW  the l# s  o f non-combotont llv #  m  Ifimqtodlent. If, he sold, men ere 
foolish enou^ to rn i^e ^  In wcrfcre, their lock o f wlsdmii It im t thm  {ustifleatlofi 
for hophozcrd memo* On the ccmtrwy, there Is a positive obligotlm  to !##«# 
the esoUsnltous otpects cd warfare In every way possible. This line of reosonl#^ 
wos capped by his belief that the attainment of a j# t and kstlng peoce Is preju­
diced In dir#st proportion to the lock o f restraW practiced by the ultimate victcvs
5w hile securing their victory.
Even though the views of Admiral Dickens «mnstltute o categorical rejec­
tion o f the str#egy behind the Combined Bo#Aer O ^m slve, there Is wpreseed
% id ., n>. 31-42.
% y . ,  pp. 75-81.
12
throvghouf hî$ w riting a profound cfprecisition for o ir power in the obstroot. It is 
only w ith Its W#W Wcr II cpplicotlon thot he quowekf
An oltogether difFmrent opinion of the role o f #tr@t#;*o o ir power wm ex- 
premed by Mo|or A lexm d# P# de Seversky.^  He olm  believed th #  the great 
bombers were misused, Imt his t<fo# grm  out o f o oonoef# foot ww os extreme in 
Its fundommtols os Admiral Dickens* con#f# mm comenrattve# For from occept- 
ing the idea that the strategic effort wot Im ufficlently Integrated with Im d and 
sea power, Sevmsky held that the whole W oir power wm insufficiently exploited* 
Whatever m lsfbrtm # it  oxperkmoed w #e the raswlt o f failure to obtoin fu ll com­
mand o f the skies. Only by achieving such m^msocy m uld the bomber# r«m ^ 
freely and perform the mWom frxr which they Hod been dmdgned*^ Further, he 
believed that a ir power alotw could Iwtng victory. In Seversky's wmrdsi
A ir power okme con impose surrm d# on on enwsy. . . .The goal o f a ir 
power cfp tied W ro ^ lca lly  W not bodblng m  on end in Itself but m #w W  
of th e g lr. Inwhl#% bom&lng ism  Incldetoalprocedure. O n#  a'lwi'fcm 
Ï3«15fîppid its odvmsory M  a ir paw#, d ra in ing  the r l^ t  o f way ov#  
hi# te rrlto g , bomblf^ fo llcw t m n#toed to confirm the victory m d enforce 
w rrend#,
Seversky has lm% been on mrckmt cmd imoomprommliqi cxIvoWe o f a ir 
power. His w ritiiigs ore polmniool, but, W# a sow#, fiercely hone#. Hence,
^Almmn^ F. de Sevmsky, Air Fewer# Key to Survival 0^sw York# 
Simon md Së$u#er, 1950).
^IbW., pp. 197-22J. 
®tt»id.,p. 198.
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in evaluating the future o f atr power, he demomk thot the prepwotlm  o f modem
strategies be hm&d more upon lemom dwtved frorn the fo ltu r#  #  the po# them 
9from suoamm.
A third e ritico l view o f the sfrot«^le a ir offom lve he» been supplied by 
Ker# RoWrts <&eenfleld in o book of reflective #soys upon Amerloon yomd stra­
tegy dbring the war* His opinions s#ve at o w fu l oompfoment to tWre dis- 
mmed above beemmt they r###ent o loholarshlp mrlehed by bng ossoeiatim
Ï I
w ith the United # o t#  Army; m ldîtioim lly they provide a bakmee to the Navy
cmd A ir Force pemmtlor# o f Dlokens and SeverAy, Greenfield orgu# that the
stratégie oa* offensive ww on influetolo l factor la the défont o f Gmmmy, but not
0 decisive cm# (In the sen# of dellv#im ^ the victory). W hile giving generous
rec^m ltlon to the m llltcry contributions o f the a ir arm, he cites mm%y deficiencies
w ithin the A llied  a ir e ffort, most o f which he attributes to orgcmlzotlrmal prdblems
Î2cmd to inter-iervlce strife cmd bull-heoéscbw#.
In évoluâtl#to the bonfo# oo n^lg ^ he notes that, by the time It hod 
reached its peak o f effectIvenem (early 1945), Hie ground fo r ^  o f the A llies hod 
by then v irtua lly  #uAed Hie Germcm m îlltctfy nmcàlne* His mafor concession to
221.
RabMrti G fM tifi* ld , Amwicon Str<rt*ty in World War H< A
R #m m id##an # @ltWares Th# jofowTKpwSnRm S^^
 ^^ Doctor Greenfield served from 1946 to 1958 os Chief Hisforlon o f the 
DeporWmt o f tW  Army,
^^Greenfleld, op. c it.,  p p ,# - 112#
Mthe Combined B w è# mm that " It hWemd the internal e o lls ^  of
Like Dickens, G rem fleld deplored the lndls#lm lnote choro#er o f the 
boadblng* He eorefully dlsHngwlshed between the Am#leon tactic o f doyllgfit pre­
cis im  bombing s ^ ln s t selected tm ^ f ^#ems and the k ltis h  technique of night­
time crea bonding. W hile m #ki%  the obviou# operational differences, he con­
cluded, nevertheless, that in practice the rwuIts were the some—a nxnsive bludg- 
e # itf^  succeeding more from sheer weight o f repetitive effort thon from "pickle 
barrel”  accuracy. Etosplte their seraitlvlfy to the comequenc# o f mm  attacks, 
Hw American leaders, he states, were often <»sqtoll#d by the cirasnstances of 
adverse weather and prksitlve bllnd-bcsAlng techniques to use their forces in a 
fashion not unlike the British.
As a fina l crgument, O rem fleld, w ith o Jilnt of satisfaction, informs 
his readers that the Combined BomW Offemlve mode its most te lling  cofWrlbutlon 
to the A llied  canqsalgn in o purely to c tiW  role—whm it conducted a s&etalned 
attack upon the German tmnspcrtcSlen sy#cm in p rq ^ o tlm  for the Normandy 
invcnicm. In this comectlon It is o f W erW  to note that, durir^ this $dmse of 
cqwotlens, the Combined Bomb# Offensive perfomed under the d ire#  mmmmd 
o f Supreme HeWqtmrt## A l 1 led E^qmdltlonmry Fore#, function!#^ apart from the 
ccnitrol o f foe a ir power qpeclol### who, Greenfield Incites, would not have 
sanctlcmed such employment of their forms*
pp. 117-118.
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M wfool of the Rc^ol A ir F#ce Sir Arthur Harris stood, not ofow  but 
omfuqilouously h i^ ,  among the sndivicbols who championed the strsdeglo bombing 
policies of the A llies* Even though he l^ w  his critics to be legion, he emlntoined 
throughout the war o dog^^ fa ith in Bonfoer Command emd Its toctlcs* In @ bluntly 
(W alled ocmunt o f his wartime years, he upheld the logic o f his emtlons emd colled
to task those in high p loc# who hod either oppowd his proposals or thwcnrted his
16programs*
Sir Arthur believed thot the war msuld be won by a carefully plomW  rmd
17prop#ly executed boWmr ©ffmwive* The #ength o f his opinions fe ll sho# of 
the extreme positîvîty of those o f Seversky, W t amor^ his cmtemporcrles they 
w #e none the lees coWrovmrslal* A lthouj^ the Marshal may hove s^eed, in 
theory, with the M ajor, he was too much o f o pra#lcal eoldW not to h illy  op- 
precWe the doctrinal ottachmeids of the oth# two services and, m a coral- 
Icry, the ostoremce o f their p#$lst#ice« Always the prs#matl#, he saidi
Winning o wear by bombir^, as at th #  ten# we were prapraing to 
do, mo tm m  several things* It may mean b r îi^ ii^  the memy's war 
e#srt so con#W #ly to a stond#lll foot ym  are invited into the country 
to c le #  up the m#s; In which mse the only #m y you w ill need w ill be 
a w ell-trained police force* Or it may mean little  more than sofrenli^ 
up the enemyfo défoncés, mnmunlcations, m d wm Imd%»tries so (# e c- 
tive ly  In #hÂmce o f a w e ll p r^w ed Inrasim  that that inveslm goes
^^Arthur Hmris, Bomber Offensive {Lmdm# Collins, 1947), 
p. 54.
Lionel limay. The MemoW of Qenawil Lartl Imwy (New Yorki
The V iking Press, 1960), pp* 245 and # # * '.................. ........ ......' '  ' '
16
occordlng to plcmi \n w h i^  cate you w ill meed a Iwge oml v# y  w e ll- 
equlmod wmy, AW , of o w te . It may inam , m d probably do# mem, 
sometliifig betoem these two alternative#.
The found#im  of H #rb* operational eredo was painfully single—bmnb
the cities wherein German w #-s#tain lng industry was located. He did not shrink
from odmlmion foot this Inevitably memt fa ta liti#  among nm -condxtfm », hot he
rather caval ie rly explained away the neW w ith c i# ie s  of dmifow justIflcotions,
a ll #  which reduced to a fm n of "war Is hell** #titude* The or^^ento tlon could
hove been mccfo sponger by placing #rect# emptonis i^on the ravings In A llied
rxnuoltim  where the derations were raccessfol to the extent o f avoiding lend m -
gogements In the cmcult o f the o b |e c tlv # .^
"Bomber** Harris, m  he was celled, was utterly candid cèout the m rly
failures o f Bomber Conmmd, but urawervlngly loyal to its ultimate successes. He
remained to foe end ur^erturbed about the inab ility o f his staff and the Americsm
to resolve foeir lo r^ ^ o n d it^  dîffmence over the most effoctive moctos ocerondl
To Sir Arthur foe m ctt# was not worfoy o f argument. His own vindlmsdion of night 
bombing v#su# daylight "precision'* bonfoing derived, he claimed, from achieve­
ment—not theory. By the middle o f 1944, cmd coincldmit w ith the de terio r# i# i 
o f Genncm a ir defense, the British ottemks, according to Hcmris, . .proved to be
r#her more cxtoumto, mudi heavier In weight, end nrare concetoroted, foon the
21Americcm dayligfo cdtocks,. . . . His views were th#® of a stolwcart man 
^% crrii, op, c it. ,  p. 54, ^ b id . , pp. 176-177,
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wbot® lasting oceamplishment# followed a la r^ # r i#  o f firing  batti##—w ith frlemb 
cmd foe a like ,
Farhq» leu paroditol, cmd omrfofoly lets enrattonalfy c h o r^ , was Hw
overview of stroteglo a ir power w rltton fo 1946 by Owwral Carl A, Spwtz, who
22oommanded the Ifolted St#es Strcdegtc A ir Forces In Europe. The cool cfofoc-
tiv ity  o f General Spaotz, at c o lo re d  w ith hi# counterpart. Sir ^ ih u r Harr»,
may be mq^lained either at a temperammtal dlfrerence betwem the two men, or
because Spoatz had not, as did Harris, over two demades o f service In m  irk ^ e n -
d#*t a ir force* His position, then, m  a general officer in the United St#es Army
could very w e ll smcount for his tenqpered appraisal o f the role o f a ir power In the
defe# of Germany.
General Spaotz Introtfowd On interesting verlant to the them# of Harris*
He sugge#ed that the outcome of the wmr m lÿ it have been difforent had the Nazis
used strategic bombltto ® vmt sm ie. The penalty they paid for their falW e
to capitalize on pmwessed ski Ik  so evidently m n## lb le  w ith the # ra t# ic  bombing
24concept was nothing l#s them their total defe#,
^C m ri A * Spa#z, "S t(# ^ ic  A lr " l^  TW
MGt of A ir Few#, ed« Eugene M* Emme (Princeton, New Je rs^ i D. VaJT^HffSid
CoiîÿeBiy,'i *
^ b id . ,  pp.
^IroB ioolly, H itle r teera to hove grayed the idea o f strategic b o d in g ,
but he Imd m t the singleness of puipose to mém o f it a reality* In Berlin, on 25 
July 1 9 ^ , he said #  a da ily m ilitary aonfmrencet
I have olraW y fold you. * .tW  tm m  con only be Woken by tmrror* One 
has to counter-cdlack, everythir^ else Is mmmm* * . .In  my opinion we should 
use our plams for attacking them d irectly, m^mclally since foey are puttl#} so 
mmy pkme# In the air* . . .But we are hm dllng them w ifo kid gloves. It Is 
^ in g  fo wmrk only If we attack their c iti#  systematically. . . .1 con only win 
the war if  I dW roy more of tim  enemy's than he (fostroys of ours.
Rc^zztswi in H itler Directs His War, ed. Felix G ilb # t (New York: O i^ d  University
Press, 1 9 5 0 ) , ' 3 9 ^ 4 1 . ' ~
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In foe maffer o f foe svpremooy of oir In foe bottle c ^ W t Germony,
Spootz oonetuded that foe .H i#  could m t hove mm foe wor solely w ith itrotegle 
bofifoert. The bcslt for his belief rested not In o diravowol of foe bonfoing strategy, 
but in foe framework of time In which the wor wos fought. Hod foe A llies enterW 
foe mm w ith the o ir power they wmre cbte to drwr t^ pon ot foe end, there erauld 
uncbubtedty hove been m  entirely d lffo rm t chmractmr to the ^m fllc t—one In whicfo 
foe new technique of ercrfore m uld hove been the dominant fo r# . But os it was, 
the long deloy required to build to mmlmwm #r#% fo geve to o ir o peatIdpating— 
but not ^ ^ )o n d # w t-^ a re  in the vIcW y o b r^  w ith see m d lo n d .^
To «toPoH his own cqqxraliat, the General quoted foe opinions o f several
re^oosible enemy o fflc io li. Oms of foe most relm^mt stotmsm# wos ottrfbuted
to Lieutenant Gen#ol Limnorz, commomW of foe 26fo Pmzm Division, who sold
during Intenogotlofi on 26 ju m  1945$
In my you might hove wcm the wor tfoough strategic bombing
olone—granted odequ#e bmm, tm tlm lîy  mmmd. Since you wmtod 
to end the wor ^ îc k ty , you did n #  rely on strategic bombing clone; 
you fought the war in combined op##ions on land, sec, and o ir. A t 
the b^Inn ing of foe wmr we fo iW  to see that foe m ##Iot power o f 
the ooolltlon r^ In s t m was strain enough to dW ray w#r war Im W rles 
by #rat#g1c o ir attacks, even If we took foe whole G ontlnm t. As our 
Iwdms c o u l& 't eee th is, m d os ymi were m w llllng ly  to rely m tlre ly  
on s tr# ^ ic  bm nblt^, ymi brought the wm to m  oartym d niceeefoil 
clew  by bW$ strategic orW tactica l me o f o ir power
A ll of the forego 1$  ^m$pressIons #  opinion serve m b a d ^m W  mcderlal 
for a nrare detailed mramlnotion o f foe # ra n^lc  a ir offom lve cmd some o f Its llm l- 
tenions* As cm irtrocfoctfon to this dlsoitsion, cm observât km o f Seversky Is pe rtl-
^^Spootz, op. c it . , p. 236. ^ fo ld ., pp. 232-223.
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fien ti m to #  d  foe Mlemy of oM-
o #  e lr m raN iy, t i or •  27
27##v#Ay, SltSJÉb- ' #* 2W# @$oll#*wd In foe orlgleeL)
cn m m  hi
EARLY c o N a m
The mr concepts ailmlnotti^  tn Hie opmxtiwis of the Combined
Somber Offensive of World Wor II hqd their origin# In World W<sr I. Germm bosd>-
Ing roids over Imndon by Z^ppeUm mW glcmt Gotbo bomb## emmd oonstdercèle
constmnotiwi cmd promoted o Srif Idi govemmmt lnv##lg#ory committee to mtess
the threot from the stondpoint of gyordlng It cmd, o*#, to determine the
u tility  of the toctic m a method of Field Morshol ion Chrtsflon Snmts of
the Union of ^u th  Afrlcso wot the committee dioim m i. One of the repo#* Issued
by the committee stoted#
A ir Swvlce# . .cm  be used m m  Incbpemknt meor» of wor operations. 
Nobody that witrmmed the # tw k  on LmWon m  11th A lly  could have cmy 
doubt on then point. Unlike m tlltery, on air fleet con eondbct extmslve 
«^motions far from, and IndepmWmtly both Army «aid Merry* As for
m  can at present be foreseen there I* dbsolutely no iW It to the scale of 
Its future ind^mmW t war use* And the de^ may not be for o# when oertol 
^sro tlom  w idi their devmtotlm enemy laWs and deWruction of Indin** 
tria l ami populous cent## on a vast scale may become the principal operw 
tlons of wear, to which the o l ^  fo rw  of mil Itcry <md naval operatior» may 
become secondary end subordinate. *
In America# however# fh#e wo* very little undertdondli^  of the military 
potential of olr power. Although the olrplomi wm m excltli^ coition to the 
military arsenal# the scheme# for Its employment were tWedlve cmd# for the most
The Second Report of the Prime Minister*# Committee on Air Orgmilza* 
tion and Name Defense Again# Air Raid#, ** doted 17 August T9T7, ^o#ed In 
Emm®, cy . pit. # p. 35# As a result of this report # i Independent Bombing Force 
was e#3m3% and soon followed by an outononraus Royal Air Force.
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part, developed on an ad hoc basis. In fact, one senior Army officer described 
the fledgling staff of the Air Service as a "lot of good men running around in 
circles.
After the United States entered the war a young major named William 
M itchell was sent to Paris as a repr^entative of the A ir Service. He remained 
in France for the duration of the war, rising rapidly through various staff and com­
mand assignments to the rank of brigadier general. In May of 1917 he visited 
Major General Hugh M. Trenchard, then commander of the Royal Flying Corps, 
and listened attentively to the crusty British general as he explained his ideas 
about the offensive nature of air power, the value of deep-penetration bombard­
ment, and the need for a unified air ccxnmand. These became the principles that 
guided M itchell until his death.^
During the time that M itchell held the position of Chief of the A ir Ser­
vice, First Army, American Expeditionary Force, he lacked the resources to mount 
anything more than a token bombing effort against the Germans.^ Although a
^Wesley Frank Craven ond James Lea Cate (eds.). The Army Air Forces 
in World War II, Vol. I: Plans and Early Operati<ms: Jonuwy 1 %9 to August 
(Ch icogo: The University of Ch icc^ go Press, 1 , p 11
^ Ib id ., pp. 12-16.
^h e  total weight of U. S. Bombs dropped during World War I was 138 
tons—or 275,000 pouncb. (Craven and Cate, I, 15.) During the first month 
(August 1940 of Its operations in World War II, the USAAF dropped 166 tons. 
("Statistical Appendix to Overall Report [European War] " , The United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey (Washington: U. S. Government Printing O ffice, 
lW 5 ] , p. i f . )
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Strategical Aviation of the Air Service had been formed <md o eemprehem*
stv® plan laid down for the «Htack of German tmrgeti# the field form* had nelth# 
wfflelW  bomber* to emfy out the plm# nor, even hod the eqpipmmt bem avail-
dbie, the approval of f^for Genwal .Mm J. Fmèing, ooamond# of the Amerl-
5em Expeditionary Force.
The limited bombir^  succesm mrpwrimcW by the Allie# were encoun^- 
Ing to the extent that on agreement wa* reached cm 3 October 1918 to mreate on 
Inter-Allied IncMxmdent Air Force under the general iuperviiMi of Mmbal 
Ferdinand FWi# the Allied Supreme Coammdmr* Operational mmmand wa# to 
be vested in Trenchard, cmd the mn#egy premmtly pattermd aftmr his convic­
tions. Evm Mitchell** hxrce* would have become m Integral part of the
unified commmd, the Wilton Acbiinlstmtion severely prorarlbed for the Anerlean 
element cmy form of strWegy that would have . ,a# it* ob|ective, promiscuous 
bombing upon lmà#ry, commerce or populatW, in enemy aountrie# ditassociated 
from obvimm military ##ed* to be wmvod by axdi act ion#tn any event, the pro­
tect was abandoned with the #lgning of the Am Mice a month later#
The 1^ 0* of TrendKxd md Mitchell had a great deal in omnmon with 
thoee of General Giulia Douhet, m Italian ex-aavalrymcp and an advomad 
thinWr on the sub{e# of air poww. Daub# believed that the next war would be
^Alfred F* Hwley, Billy rMitchellt Crusader for Air Fow#^  fr4ew York# 
Frrniklin Watts, Inc., 1964, p. 33#
p. 37.
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total mâ wouW Involve the heartlandb of the mmhotw#*. The woy to #*we 
haortloiKh was, of oowse, through the air# New wdncmoe and ohemlml munition* 
wmild put at risk the enemy*# vital oerHer*, which, <mce reduced, would cau$e 
him to sue for peace Wore land and tea force# hod been committed to long, bloody, 
and indeclWve mgagement*# The key to this mapfsèlllty wo# olr superiority, which 
would permit, after the de*trueti<m of the enemy*# otr defeme, unimpeded transit 
over hi* territory# All of thme <^ »er#lon* would be conAicted by cm ImWpendwt 
air arm whose octivltW would not, exm# in a gcmerol $mm, be omociated with 
the ob|ectiv#s of eithar the onwy or the novy#^  Before he died in 19^, Douhet 
could reflect upon the reward* of hi* pre#lence—ridicule, in i^semmmt, oW 
wide^eod, obtuse d^elief.
The war w$ded withcxit the Wvooate* of strategic bombing having had an 
^poftunity to {xove their theories. The im^-term effect of their tnc^ility to cite 
historiool evidence In support of their the**# wm to dmy them, in the UNsîted 
State* at lee#, any mecmingful occ^tmee of the new Idw*. That olr should be 
independent of both sea and lemd, cxgonlmtlmally and opemtionolly, wo* regarded 
m 0 heresy too mctreme to be token seriously. On the oHm^  Wmd, the demonstrated 
effect iveme## of olr power in support of battlefield obfectlvm argued Wrongly for 
the oontinuonce smd, indeed, the sirei^ thmfilt^  of air In th# role#
In Ore# Britain the situation wo# wmewh# di#@rent. As a ossmmipmm
^Otulio Douhet, The Commcmd of the Air, tram# Dino Ferrari (Mew 
Ymrk* Edwcrd McCann, I , pp. ''
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of Smuti*s recommendation the Royal A ir fkree hod been formed os a seporote and
S:mM*endent smvioe on \ April Î918* The yeen of autonomy betwem the war# 
fxovtded Oft <^»portufiity for novel and leonoolasMe #rategle* to be developed. 
Under Trenchard, now an A ir Marshal and Chief o f the A ir Staff, Hie domrlne of 
strategic bcmbmrénent vwp» refined md extemkd to the point where it was su^eited 
that, in war, mafor re lia n t diould be placed upcm the offensive strength of the
p
bombers.
The mposwre of England to Gerwm bomblr^ raids during World War I 
unc^estiondily fostered a ciimeHe of opinW  (essentially vengeful) that was at least 
pcrtio lly receptive to the new air doctrines* The real fxablem wm that although 
the new fmoe was thought to have cwwldmrc&le strategic potential. It was a fmrce 
additive in cost to boHi the Royal Navy md the Royal Army, The vm #able tra­
ditions cmoeWed with the two old<w servlcm md the myriad loyaltle* attcMitng to 
each prevented any wicMpreod belief that air could easume ckfeme burdm  at the 
esqpense o f either o f the swior services. Thus, when World Wcr || come, the
Derek Wood md Derek Denqpster, The N#row Margin* The W tle  of
Britain md the Rise o f A ir Fowm' 1930-19# j^lew Vbrb 
S ^S m y , "{nc7, 19&1f, p i " S I  '
^Chmrles W aster and NcHile Frmkland, TW S ^ e g lc  A ir Offensive
%alnst Oermcmy 1939-1945, Vol. Is Preparation''Kdiklont' M# M a|S K *sIfa - 
'tm ^ y  iW ))T p . Sé.
^%©b@rt Saum&y, A ir Bombard###* The Story of Its Development (New 
York# tWrp# & Brothers, 19^î)7W"3FQ531pprTBP®rH 
however, that the Brttîdi in t## ts in Iraq, Trmforckiii ami Aden during the period 
between the w m  were secured by the Royal A ir Force. Using precision bod ing  
tochniqumt again# the villages of rWrWmy desert tribesm#%, the British were able 
to maintain air w ntm l aver vast #r@tëws of tmrritory without the expense of sup­
porting Icrge occupation fore# in those mom*
design# of Treneherd hod not moterîalîzed into e fomldeWe offe#$#!ve eopabilfty.
For no to## sigpilfioW  remon them ooncorn for its own syrvivoi, the Royal A ir 
FOree began the war m  the defensive.
In the period between the w m  the Ibiited States military ^iloeofHiy was 
rtmrowly defsmsive. The emotional pemdwlvm-ewing a ft#  World War I had birowgW 
wlHi it Q determined Wlotionism# the m ili$#y task wea viewed m being limited 
to the defense of the West#n hemisj^ iere—a tcsA Ideally suited to the W ted  States 
Navy, Not being entirely unmindful of the experismces of World Wm* I, the writers 
of m ilitary doctrine did accept the populate that. If wm come, only m  offmwive 
s tro t^y  could prevail, and that memt the Oonquest of om  land csmy by onoth#, 
lu t because it was the intention not to again becmne involved In a ^eo f ftxelgyi 
wm, only a oeoll standi^ mwiy wo# maintained^ a dedsian fortified h f the know- 
fe d ^  that, if  the need arose, divisiom could again be mobilized and tron^orted 
overdo# to the crena of ccmffict.
This doWrine wm not h illy  o co ^e d  by the A ir C or^. Loyal to the ideas 
&hough not the Imubmdlnot® toctim# o f l î f ly  M ltd ie il, the A ir C o ^  Toctioal 
Sdiool favored a # ro h ^  based vpm  the dmtiuetlon of tW  w ill of the enmny to 
eeotinue fa t in g . This would be done by bombing the elmmmts of his society 
imcessory to provide for ondsuj^ort h it m ilitary fore# <md, at the some time.
H# S, Hcmsell in Hie Muir S* Fairchild Addnm to the A ir War 
College, Mmewell A ir Force Base, Alcboma, 1 De#md># 1964. M aM  General 
Fksnsell, ÜSAF $tet«), is a distinguished m llilery scholw cmd was a leading A ir 
Corps planner before and during World Wcr II.
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tbreotenlig the swvival of his govemmmta* apparatus heczmse of the great luf-
forirg (mpowd vpm the population* The wleotW of Individual target# wa# to bo
mode by m#oi#lng a highly prwtloal Wmulo that weighed both to r^  worth cmd
the probability of a smcewfyl attack ogaWt It, (See Appendix Î ,) Ih ît doctrine
formed the patten f#r the air o^n#ivo | oHwr éscnifte# were develi^imi fm  air de-
12
fmue arW air of the wrfoc# forces* The reco^ltlcn of the trl-pcntite
rei^ xmslbilltf# thcd the Air Corps had aé#@d v\mm of air power that
were le# extreme than those held by some of their luropecm wntemparwles.
In Octdmr, 194!, the Secretaries of Wcr md Navy wwe directed by 
the Fr#ldent to pr^ xsre their Wimat# of what each of the swvicei would respire 
In the event of wee* Unfortwwtely, neither a strategic purpwe nor a set of qual i­
fying s#umpti#a was contained In the hr#ldent*$ m#sege« There were no begin­
ning "ground rules" so each service prepared Its retpkements on the basis of how 
its plorm## fbrecs# the United St##* participation In the war. The Navy saw a 
vast naval stmggle with while the Army visualized a wntlnental effort
13against Oemxmy—with all of Its camplm problems of tromsportatlan aW loglstl#.
bemersed In a bag of detail, the War Department had little time to com­
pute the ree^lre^fiis of the Air Corps* Thus, whm Hie Air W# Fkaw Dlvsslmi of 
the Office of the Chief o f Air Corps offered to submit chi Air Annex, the gesture 
wc# ^#e& lly accepted. But whm the <Hniex wm rev lewW in its final form there 
wm bitter eppmltMi to Its Inclusion by a mmkm of officers an the General Staff#
27
The mquiremenN expressed therein, md the estlmqted resource elleeetlen to sup­
port them, were by m  meons eommrvotive. Notwithstanding this opposition, 
Oeneroi George C. MetshoH, Chief of StoFF, directed the Inclusion of the annex
In the plcm fotworded to the Secretory of Wor.
Despite its sdtoinlstmftve support by the O iie f of Staff, the Air Corps
p lw  (des*$p%@ted AWFD-Î) d#ered In it# boele phlloso^y from those of the Army
ond the Novy. AWPD-1 m d its fdllow-wp pim, AWTO-2, loîd the groundwork
for the employmmt of ikilted Sted# olr power* In the se#km deoling with stre*
tegy AWFD-Î ploeed first # io lty  on m  o#r o##»lv# ogaimt Germony, idotii^
thot the end purpme of the olr w#r would be;
To woge o swtolned ok offemlve cgoliwt luropeon Axis M llito ry power.
To opply olr pm m  for o breakdown of the W ustrlol and eowomW stra©- 
ture <^^Gemxmy* To sufqmrt o final offmsive if  Invasion bemm# neoes-
The snpt ieotlon of the p irn  wm, unmlWekAly, thot ok could conceivdbly 
win @ victory without on Invasion being necemsy, Nswm^er, when Hie overoll 
picm wo* prepored by tl#  Joint A n n )^o vy  Board, there wm not even o pmstng
reference to the "sustokied olr o#m#ive, " ond the domlmmt #rot<%*c oonc^t
\
pc#uloted the c loe lm l co##ontotlon of surface forcm, fo llow lig  the truism th#
wors could only be won by lond otmies. It was not until the ARCADIA md Cmo-
blesioo conferences thot cleorly defined poi ic i#  with reqsect to the opplic#ion
16
of olr pew# were flnotly enunciated*
’ ^ feid. told.
’ S id .
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YWughwjt the yecHi of #q>eosement #W mtt-reodîig of the Hcœî threat, 
the Briteh Ak Staff remained attached to the prW lple of offense w hidi Trenchard 
hod so eweh^Hy nurtured. Because the thrmd was mis-read. Hier® were few In­
dividuals (outside of the military) interested in challenging a strategic theory that 
sounded plausible, even if  it hod not been tested In war. When, In 1934, a sms# 
of j^ow iig  dmger b^pm to gpip the British people, m  mumemmu W tW need for 
accelerated mil Itcry fw^rarotion grew «goce.
Faced with Hie tcek o f repairIrg over o decode of n ^ le c t, the competi­
tion for rmources csnerg the Hiree services become acute. A new md diorpened 
Illumination was thrown upon the Air Staff doctrines when it  becomo oppcrent that 
the omnWry could build upon one prW lp le—eith#  o#@rae or defenra— but not both. 
The intelligence #tlm #es of the Wrai^ ph of the Luftwaffe vls-o-vls the Royal Air 
Force dicwed obi alarm lig numerical superiority on the Gmrmm side. Influmiced 
by this knowledge, the decision wm mWe w ithin the Government to give priority 
to defense.
Consequently, Bomb# Command entered the war uigropored lor the o f-
feraive tWc recommencbd by the A ir Staff. H) retrospect, howev#, the wioMn of
the decision Is clear. The a W c#  fwoé^ced for Fighter Commsmd (mid the radms
to guide them) provided the margin of victory In the Battle of Britain, granting to
Bonds# Ccmmmd Hi# precious time to build and train for the eventual omoult tpon 
17H!tl#*s Germany.
^^W#»ter and Frwiklond, I ,  65-90.
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only wm Bomb# Gemmond deflclmt in #ews #W «îrcre^ #  the 
begiimlrg of the wor, but, oddltim olly, it found itself without on «greed mi#lon, 
or ot l# o t o mission of the kind envisioned in the early 19^*s, After Î934 num­
erous sëiem# had been drown up for the attack of indu#rial cmters, ooamunlca- 
tim s hdm, power systems, md other m ilitary cd»|ectlv#. A ll these plans suf­
fer#! from the uncertainties dbrlving horn the lock of kmwledge of whm and whmre 
the war wm to b ^ in , cmd how the memy would d e p l^  his strengths. Fwthermmre, 
exploratory staff convemHions with the Franoh, when the war wm close at hand,
reveal#! the disquletirg expectation (to Bomber Commmd# that Hie entire bomber
ISforce would be used m long roige artille ry In supgort of the French Ansiy*
But even after the knpmtunlngs of the French had been disrcgarcbd, the 
development of a picmsible tcrget system separate from the then con]e#ural tacti­
cal kaW requiresmnts wm o d iftim ilt matter. The rarge I Imitât kms o f the atrmaft 
In the Bomber Ccamnond squadrons estcèlldied on autonxitie sanctuary for those 
German tmgets deemed w it# le  for attack, but lying beyond the mmdmum radius 
of operotimw* The cmollory to this problem, then, wm the «piestionable prudence 
of striking half-blows #  an enemy whose capacity to retal iate for wmeded the 
attackers* ab ility  to In flic t punishment. Afgreciatim i of this disturblrg reality 
led Hie Govwrnmmit to mmounce on 21 An# 19# that Britain was sensitive to the 
eftect* of WiserWInate bombing mid would, Hierefore, consider only the attende
and FrankloKi, I, 86-306.
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of mliltcBy ob|#ctlve$, and fhm wtfh due regerd f#  ctvllkm  eoxroîHe». The defl-
19nlflon of "Riiltfary objective*" wm mot supplied.
The wmr opened with hardly a glimmer of how it would mnolude. The
main tmk for which Bomber Coaenand wa# than ëw ged, be# equipped, and be#
p re ye d  wa# Hie dropptig o f propcgemda leaflets over enemy tmritory—at night
It was a time Intense ftu#ratian, dolehilly reflected in the @&##vatlm of Sir
Arthur Harris to one of hi# close mmclates# "Ivory time you p m  a lamp p©#, take
yow hot o ff, Waause if  the war stmrt* serloWy the blame I# # lr g  to be put on u#
f l
cmd that I# wh#e we dxsll flnW i, "
S ^e n A #  1 ^  to May 1940 was tW  period of the "fdiony" wm, whl#i 
fwovîded bmkm  Command the respite to p im , organize, and train the force for 
the in fin ite ly greater eftW  to follow. Duriig this the# Bomb# ComnwW sought 
to oomm^ o its f#ees, leaviig the in itiative to Ommmy* Attacks again# laW 
tmge# were prcHi&ited, k it  no r#trai#ts w#e imposW upon cperations «gain# 
enemy naval vmaeli m d d iipp iig . Becosise attacks cgoln# su#% targebi required 
fu ll vW bility, the sorti#  were ©enflned to Asylight hours. These early forays 
proved to be oW ly bem#e the bmnbers, with their xsonty defemlve armament md 
relative disadvantage in speed, were ewy prey to Gennan fighters operating from 
comtal a irfie ld#*^
^^Web#er and Fmnkkmd, I,  86-106*
% »W ., p p . 36-37.
21Harris, op. c it* , p. 32.
^^eW er and fVarddmd, I, 192-1##
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NoM ltW ondüg the position of Infor tor Ity In which the B rit#  found
thomsokos, the A ir Staff was oworo tW t if  the Gomwms hroodenod the scope of
the wm by unrestricted bombing, by Invmlon of the low Cotmh’los, or b#h, tfm
Royol A ir fmm would be forced to rwpond, mm ot the r #  of severe loses* Ac-
oordlfgiy, a p lm  was drown up for ottock of the Ruhr industriel complex# It wm
Q lucrotlve orw  w ithin rmge of the bomb##, end moreover, there were within it
terg#s such os #eel mill# end e ll r@ fln#l# tk #  were self-il lima Inott^# tW
re c f^ ize d  the ##eme vulnertè lllty of their olrcreft during ^ y lig h t, the Bomb#
21Gommond leaders were mm beginning to fmm nighttime operotlim#
On 10 May 19# the Oermem» opmed the W #tern ofhsnsive* With the
sovcgn» bombing of RotterAm it wen InmedWely eppmrent that hod m
W e#ion following rmdrlctive bombing practices. The reo llm tlm  of what wm
to come caused the British War Coblnet to authorize bombing attacks east of the
Rhine River. Thus k g m  the strategic bombing offensive og^W  Oermc^—em
24offensive which was to ecWlnue over the nW  five years*
For the next two years Bonèer Goomond bed the unrewarding experiemoe 
of knowitg fu ll well w h# It wmted to do, but without the whmrewlHiol to do it# 
The ccmmond wm &f*c*#%t in sultdble aircraft md trained crews, nav1g#ionol 
techniques and eqpipmmt, commun1c#lcm gear, cmd effective oràiemce. At no 
time, howevmr, did the Ab Staff m BomAer Gommmd wav# from their convictIm 
tkst the offense hod to be pursued unrelentingly# Signal succwse# were oWalmd
% w . ^ V id „  p. 144.
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m W kW  raWs, but §m the most part the burden of the time were borne more by 
the ipirît of the mmm thm  by their occomplidvneifs* In recoiling ", , ,whot It 
meant to go mf night after night from o dorkened field In tîncolrahîre into thot 
cold Inferno over Germany, . . " Mczskil of the Royal A ir F#ce Sir AHin Steisor 
lAserved thot. In general, the result# of the mWlon* w #e poor and that **• # .the 
crew# were sustained by the belief that w#e hitting the enemy hard# then 
they aetueliy were*
After the Ibilted State# entered into the war in DeWRAer, 1941, the 
first aonferenoe of the new allies (4âCADIA) wm held in WmAington, On 22 
December Prime M lfdst# Churchill w ived  with m  entourage of staff officer# cmd 
other high-ranking o ftlc iab. Rom then until 14 jcmuory 1942 the ccmf#ence met 
with their American counterpcrt# to Icy the p l#n  for the prosecution of the ww.
The confermce first detwnlned the way In w h lA  the two countries would cooperate 
militarily and, this bebg agreed, then set the braes of strategy for the ensuing 
eftort,^^
O f the many dealsiom reoAed at the conference, the most important was 
the determirmtion to place first emfHxnl# upcm the war cgolrat H itler, This wra by 
no means a popular corae in America, but It was a str#egy that hod long been 
advocated by mmy senior Army officers, Includlrg mo# of the Army A ir Forces*
^ jo h n  Slessra, The Cwtrel # lu# Autoblp#G#hy of Sir john Sbster,
MonAoi o f the RAF 04ew'%rkr"l%sdkicl(%^ 
<nd Cat#, I, 237-245.
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Among the sWtoglo w b-ob |e# iv# wm the reeff innoHrai o f the plm
to weoken Gmmmy by otr oHock, The Army Ak fm em  were to ^ in  the Royol
A ir Fofoe In oonoeotroted ottaoki m  soon ra sqwoéom# oovW be reodted f#  de-
ploymmt. Preliminary pire» set MorWi, 1942, os the dote when the first heavy
bmAradment graup# would #e#  the AtlmmtW# These pirn# fo lW  to oonslAwr ex-
pmded tro in lig  requirements cmd the reotly draperie need f#  erewi m i olraroft
in the Pcmiflo. When these fctctors were Introduce Into the fxtgrcsii, the build-
up of Anerlom bomb# fore# tn the Ikilted Kirg^kw was delayed for many mWh#^
orW the bond»# offmsive did not begin In idrm^th until a ft#  the CwAlcmco eon-
27f##nce of Jcmucary, 1943.
When the high eommcsicb met ego in, this time In CeocAicmrai, the courra 
of the w # hod b@#n to ekmge. The German offensive hod lo# % momentum as 
a rmulf of the dlsratrou# Russian oasqpolgn. Slowly the roles of the eombotonts 
began to shift, the oggrrasort beoomimg the defenders, and vice v#ra . The p # - 
pose of the #H^#ence wra to reqxmd to this shift in inîticdîve and to plan the 
A llied strategy in lîÿ it  o f the new develapmWs#^
Undei^innlig the strcHegy wra the unAokoble eraivlction thcd defeat 
Germany would have to erase thrawgh land opraotkra* Hof o il of the oonfraees 
egreed (es#^lo lly the airmen)/ but tksse who w#e the final arb1t#s prasWed in 
their erthedexy and uneq»Ivoeaily wbordinoted the strategic bombir^ campaign to
^ Ib W .
AvAxMf md Frcnklond, II, 10-21.
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fho lnvatl<m of the Omtlnent. Thus the throo-prcMged plan developed at Crao- 
blctnoa oalled . .for sustaining the Rumlm armies in the fie ld , for m ilitary 
operations of thek ^ e  Allied? own m  the Medltermnem flank ond for Intonsi-
29fy iig  the strategic bmnbing offensive c ^ lm t Gemony hwralf. " 
Quite clecrly, the olr offmsive was considered o delude to the ultimate 
invraion. the Wq»#tance of the GbsAlmoo conference to the Strategic A ir 
Offensive w #  that it gave wnlfiW dkectldm Çiowever vqgus) t# the British and 
American bocA# #>rc#, although each # ill c lu t^ stubbornly to its own Wrcd^tc 
cone^t and prefrared operational tact*#. W ithin the framework of a general 
mi«?on stohmmt, o set of specific target priorities was prra#lbedi 
W  German submarine construction yarcb. 
#  The German aircraft W u # y .
(4  Tror^ortotlon.
#  O il pl#Hs.
(e) Other targets In memy w #  Indutnry. 
The directive mHalning the priority list told the ok planners what to <k>, but not 
how to do It. Because the document required l#erpre$atkm, the obvious occurred* 
Each M ce put its mm înterj^etotM i upon the worAsge, which Hien become |%#l- 
flcotlcm fo r dcxstrlnol rigidity* To the ^ trW en t of the A IIW  omise the division 
of cginion p#sWed* Nor was the directive ever emended to the degree needed 
to resolve the Issues*^
Viewed In retmspe#, the G m Alm cc directive to the s tr# ^ lc  air ele­
ments produced m ults #mmm*#ate wlHi Its Intrinsic quality at a #o ff docume#*
^8> id . % W .
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ftrah muW Have hmn eomiderobly kqxraved* It# meming to the enemy, howev#, 
wos wnmAguera#
The s lgE iifl^oe  of tW  Ceodbtorico Directive I f#  In the fpot A ct It scnght 
to mém WWrWIm## benAIng re###é4#:'##m em s of wegW# wor# W 
the belief thot It promised to oxoroW o deoftlvo Influence on the 
of Aewor* TbeoAole of Gomony wm om# dWemd o twget oreo.^*
^%umpf, ep . elt,# p* 60.
c H m m w
STRATIGYAND UNITY 
Often m good basic Idea sufim  fmm the W W e to fellow It with eq io lly 
good supporting We#. A ease eon be mode thot this wra true of the Cemblmed
Bomber Oftmslve. Given the eraly persuralons o f both the British end Amerlram 
ok ilofts that WWegle b ra ^ lig  wmild bo lnstr%mWol In the defect of Germmy, 
it Is not w rp ris i#  thot o unified slnioture oom#lslng bWh of the bembradment 
forces wra crecded. W W  is le% uWraWméable Is th #  the neoessory sub-Wfuetures 
did not swolve which would hove mmh of the whole o thoroughly inh^oted ef­
fort, from plcRutlig to racecution* Whatever may hove been the reraom fwr not 
doing #0 at the time, today's pen^ective ram only su^gc# that subjcmtlvlty raid 
pride were in prat to blame#
Follow tig  the Craoblraica Confraenra #  w hiëi the A llies endorsed the 
ramcept of a oonAtned bonAer oftenslve, a period of thee ekgsed wherebi both 
the United Stcdes Amy A ir f^ ra s  raid the R#ral Air Force (to o ïm m  mcteid) worked 
out the plramiig details of the forthcomlig i^e m o tic  ratock upon Germany# The 
pbn^ wra (^proved by tW  Combined Chiefs o f Staff on IB May 1943 and followed 
by o frame# direntIve of Wglementedion on 10 June 1943* The ^ero tlra i wra 
desipioted by the code name FOINTBLANK»^
^"Flrai fra the Combined Bomber Offensive from the IMIted Kirgdom." 
^Qtm m  and Cote, IS, 34B and 631.
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B#cw*é Bomber Command was of meeemfty eemmlWed to might strikes
e#dmst «rea tcrgets, the task mf mf for Its oemm % FOINTWLANK was mot gyeatly 
different from what they had bem doing, enee;# the* mm they wrae merely to shift
the loci of their attacW to compl#mmt the Amralcrai daylight mWlam. These d a y  
light raids were to be eomdwated against selected military and Imdustrfol trageft, 
raid In a (gee if  led priority*
The targets described by the plrai hW berai cbraen by a o f rasolyift 
in the W rahti^on Headgicrters cH the United States Amy Ak Forces* ConvenW 
as the "Committee of Opetatlons Analysts** by Gemraal Hmry H* Ar##ld, Com- 
mandlng G ra^o l of the Army A ir Forces, the #oup sra^H fo define a syWem of 
Nrgets thcd, If destroyed, would most wesAen Germraty In Hie sbrate# time. After 
the oompletion of their work in MraWi of 1943, the findings (which ciraely op- 
proxiiimted the CasabNmca objectlvei) were *e# to the British MlnWry of icraiomîc 
Worfore, the Royal Air Force, raid the l l ^ t h  A k Force, then rammrawfod by 
Lieutenant Graieraf Ira C. laker. With only minor #m llflc# lon  the r#ortw as 
enthusiastically received and generally accepted*^
If, as originally written, the FOINfBLANK plan had been rig id ly fol­
lowed, it would have meant acaeptanee by Sk Arthur Harris of the prlnc^le of 
selective «dtacks upon l# y  industri#. The modlfiradkms In te m ln o k ^  requraded 
by Harris, orW written Into the final version o f the plan, clearly IndlWed that no 
such transformation bad takrai place* He fosd, Wtead, opraied a using
% W .,  pp. 3#-366.
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conveniently ambiguous phraseology that permitted him to proceed more or less 
unhindered along his own tack. There is reason to believe, and not unfairly, 
that Harris and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air 
Staff, were more interested in quickly developing a strong partner in the Eighth 
A ir Force than they were in arguing the niceties of a target system bosed more upon 
American estimates of capability than upon experience.^ In any event, both knew 
that to oppose the plan would have strengthened tliose other service factions in the 
United States who wished to lim it the allocation of resources to the bomber pro­
gram.^
The structure framed for the conckjct of the Combined Bomber Offensive 
was singularly informal* At TRIDENT, the Washington conference of May, 1943, 
convened to implement the Casablanca decisions, the Combined Chiefr of Staff 
stipulated that the Royal Air Force Chief of Air Staff would be their agent in the 
direction of the bomber offensive. In his 10 June 1943 directive to Harris and Eaker, 
Portal re-phrased, but generally preserved, the specifics of the Combined Bomber 
Offensive plan which had assigned the selective attack targets to the Eighth A ir 
Force and reserved for Bomber Command its main task of disrupting German industry.
It should be noted, however, that Portal was a strong suj^jorter of the 
American priority requirement to gain air superiority over the Luftwaffe. Harris 
was less ardent, although he saw the odvontoge to Bomber Command wore air 
superiority to be achieved.
Webster and Frank land, II, 17-21.
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acting, when priictlcdble. In a role complementary to Eokra'i forces. The {ob 
of ironing out the necessary details wra left by Portal to the two commanders.^
A system of #»ef#lon#, Impraed from dsove, wra cleorly neWed. Evm 
though the degpee of Integration of effort prescribed by the Combliwd Bomber 
Offensive plan wra wotered-dtown by the Portal directive, o requirrament for close 
coordinotion nom» the less existed. General Arnold, after o review of the docu­
ments, raked Sir Char Ira for the ratobllshment of some form of mochlnery thcH 
would more closely interlace the activities of the two commands. Coraequently, 
the ^m bined Operotlraml PIrainIng Conunlttee wra created. Unfortunately, the 
committee wra o planning organ that hod no directive or executive authority. It 
raxild only reconenend, ond because It concerned itself primarily with the daylight 
tragets. It berasne o consultative body whose main benefit wra to act ra liolsrai 
between Bomber Command raid the Eighth A ir Force.^
The net effect of the failure to superimpose cleor-mit direction over the
two forera wra to drive them along two praollel courses. "For the mo# port of 1943
Sthere wra no combined offensive, but on the contrary, a bonAii^ competition.** 
Fundamentally, the sWotegic issue wra not the distinction between dby 
and night bombing. Even if  it hod been, both forces were by now too far raitrenched 
through crew training raid aircraft selection to sAruptly chraige their ways of
^Craven cmd Cote, II, 373-374.
pp. 374-375.
^A/ebstar and Frank land, 11, 5.
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fighting* The reel issue was disagreement over the question cH selective or ge#^ 
e o l ottock. The Am#r$cra%s held that " it  is better to craise o high dk^ee of A t- 
sWction tn m few reolly essmtiol industrira then to couse e smell degpee of de- 
struct ion in mony industries. " This could be done by precision bombing of se­
lected key indbstrlol plraits, by raeo bombli^ o f the cities wherein the Inebstries 
were locoted# or by o cxsmbinotkm of both. The Bomber Otmmond view (oceepted 
with dim in idling enthuslram by the A ir Stoff of the Royal A ir Force) wra thot gm - 
erol bombii^ on a vest scale would groduolty# by cumulotive effect, destroy the 
motor iol brae of Germcm inA#try cmd the morale of the people who wrae reqson- 
tlb le  for prockiction. Furthermore, It wra heW, ottocks ogoînst key Industries olrase 
could be offset by dispersal ond stockpiling of critioot Items in areas unlikely to 
come under attack.
There could be no doubt sAout the logical esdmsston of the Bombra Com­
mand view. Quite simply, if  permitted to proceed without sij^mnltqt-oft the
command's strength in side exmjrsions, Harris bel loved that he could preclude cm
11invraion of the Continent. With the flush of success occralraied by his b rill iont 
attcMcs upon Hamburg cmd the Ruhr he became more adonwnt in his belief# and 
rolled ogolrat thrae who sought to divert hi# effmrtsi
^^Harris, op. c it. ,  p. Zm.
4Î
Hod I paid attention to the panooea-mongert who were eiwoys cropping 
up and hawkii^ their wwe#, BooAer Command would hove flitted  
continually from one thing to «mother during the whole pmrlod of my 
Command; the confjnutty of the offmurve m a whole emu Id hove brain 
irretrievobiy lost.
On the American side there was an equally mulish rraistonce to change. 
They, after a ll, had thrown down the glove In the Combined Bomber Offensive 
p lcm -^ith  0 scmty foundation of experience behind them (mratiy sorties «gainst 
poorly-defended French targets or very Acllow penetrations Into Oermony). With 
their insistent avowal of their copcAility to penetrate the German heartland by day 
and without fighter racort, the only course open was to attempt to prove what they 
said they could do.
Lrasons wmre learned In both camps through the notorious operations con­
creted against the boll-bewing center—Sehweinfurt. From the American stoncfooint 
the ro lA  of 17 August and 14 October 1943 sigpmlled the time of acute ratsls. On 
the first raid o loss rote of 19 per cent of the attacking frace was sustained; on the 
second, 21 per cent. These losses wmre out of a ll proportlcm to the damage and 
interference ccmsed within Ac ball-bearing Industry. Aftmr Ae first attack the 
Germans quickly recognized the A llied Intent and moved proAictton facilities to
other areas. The sacraid attack wra, therefore, of little  consequence because t
13happened after the re-location had been accomplished. Entirely dlfferm t results
^^Harris, op. c it. , p. 2 ^ .  
^^Craven and Cote, II, 681-706.
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wouM have prdaeAly been achieved if  Ae Army A ir Forera oHock hod tokrai piece 
on successive days* British follow-up sorties ot night would hove been of yeot 
rasistrmce, but the eoordlnotlon between Ae forera wos woefully deficient* The 
E iÿith A ir Force picked Ae period of a foll-moon for the August rotd, a time when 
dsviousty the Royal A ir Force could not diqxstch its bombers becouse of Aelr extrmne 
vulnerability under those condltiom.
The Americraw were faced with o serious dilemma. On the one hand, Aelr 
losses were spproochlng o magnitude that mode continued cperctlons of doubtlbl 
value. On the other hand, only by sustained operations could any tenting successes 
be attained. There were determlndble limits to the loss rates that could be born by 
the attackers in relation to Ae results the survivors could be expected to achieve, 
it  cq^eored that the limits hod been reached. The experlenraa of Schweinfurt un- 
qurationobly influenced two of the conclusions of the United States Strategic Bomb­
ing Survey;
The significance of fo il dominatirai of the air over the raiemy—Aoth 
over its armed forces arW over Its sustaining economy—must be em|A<w^ *3red.
That dcmtinction of the air was essential. WiAout it, attemks on the basic 
economy of the enemy could not hove been cblivered in W ficient force 
<md with sufficient freedbm to bring effective and Irating results.
The German experience showed that, whatever Ae target system, no 
'ndispensible Incfostry was permanently put out of commission by a single
^^Webster and Fronklond, II, 62-63.
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attack. Frarsîstcnt re-attack wot necessary.
W iAîn the Royal A ir Force, Aeir Schweinfurt incident wm m f one of 
operational signifiomce but Instead# a crisis In ovtW rlty. In December of 1943 
Sir Arthur Hccrls wrote to the A ir Ministry stating Act# w IA  only his programmed 
force of Lancaster bombers# he could make Ac German surren<for InevitoAle by 1 
April 1944. This presumed A ct the necessary priorities would be allocated for pro­
duction and repolr of aircraft# and that he would be free from divraslonray fmrce 
commitments imposed upon Bomber Command by external headquarters.
Although the position token by Harris reflected no amo than o very lltraol 
reading of the Bomber Comnxxnd miraion traked in the FOINTBLANK directives# It 
was not well-received by the Air Staff for several reasons. (1) The opinion of the 
A ir Staff was beglnnli^ to evidence growing doubts cAout the efficacy of general 
attack#. (0  The Inefteetlvenesi of the Eighth A ir Force ago Inst selected targets 
(the Luftwaffe# In portteulai) was becoming alarming. (3) The cHtocks on key in- 
du#rira required massive concentration of effort, (4  Neutralization of the German 
FiflAter Force was precomîîtiîwial to the success of OVERLORD (the Invasion of the 
Continent).
For these reasons# and because Ae entire strategy of Ae ConAined Chiefs 
of Stoft h l^e d  on OVERLORD# A ir Chief Marshal Sir Nramon Bottomley# Deputy
^^The United States Strategic Bombing Survey; Overall Reprat {European
^  (wasK% KhTTJ3: p p :
^Webster and Fronkiond, II# 53-72.
^^Ibld.
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Chief of A ir Stoff, wra forced to reply to HorrW In what amounted to an unequivocal 
reversal of the Bomber Command strategy. Harris wra instructed to shift his attacks 
to Ae selected tragets with the hope that what the IlghA  A ir Force could not do In 
daylight, Bombra Command mi|ÿit be able to do at night. Specifically, Harris wra 
preraed to strike S^iwelnfurt because of the h îÿ i priority that B ritiA  IntelHgmnce 
placed upon the Omnm  ball-bearing supply. The request wra m# hrawred. Sir 
Arthur considered the attack to be a waste of time. Clearly, the contrat had reached 
a state where the inaction of Ae Commcmder-in-Chief, Bomber Command, wra 
verging on Insubordination. The mithralty of Portal ra Chief of A ir Staff was being 
openly flaunted. Firm action wra required, not only to preserve discipline, but also 
because Portal iwd come to fu ll ogreemrait w ith the American A ir Staff as to the 
necessity for pursuing Ae detailed POINTBLANK objectives. On 14 Jonuray 1944 
a directive was Issued to Hcrris ordering him to attack Schweinfurt until it wra de­
stroyed. He continued to protest but his reasoning wra fla tly  rejected. A ^ in , on 
27 January, Portal's order wra repeated. As a consequence, but after s till more de» 
lay, on Ae night of 24 Februray 1944 Bomber Command sent 734 bombers over 
Schweinfurt. They followed o doy llÿ it attack, on the some day, by 266 bombers of 
the Eighth A ir Frace. The Combined Bomber Offonsîv® had fîmsily begun.
This emphrais upon Ae value of selective attack correspraided 
mrae closely to the aim which had Irapired the efforts of Ae E i^ th  
A ir Force than to Ae policy which hod generally and prlmraily 
governed the conduct of Bomber Cofwnemd since Ae stmimer of 1941.
Yet it wra undoubtedly the ^qporent failure of the Eighth A ir Force,
’ «Ibid.
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cutmlnaHng m the Schw©liifurt dlsosfer of OcfoWr 1943, which had 
pmduWi m ii #hi#. The confîmiiiig growth of the 0em m  fiÿ ite r 
fwce and #%e evident failure of the Eighth A ir Force to check it 
coupled with the ^iprooch of O v^lord and the ov#whel#ing need 
for air s u ^ io rity , had virtually l<Sced the A ir Staff Into what 
cmomted to a policy of ddperatlon* In fh lt eituotlon, Sir Arthur 
Harris* wgwnent for the general area assault had appeared to be 
mot W y  extravagant Wt also irrelevant, ^
A ftw  this harrowing year (194%, die forturm of both forces in^oved,
Bomber OmmmW <xx|ulred the technirÿues that pemiitted it to pxecision
might bondslmg, and the Eighth A ir Force began to receive In quantity the bmg*-
r w ^  fighters so v ita lly  needed for escort duty, A dditim olly, the American forces
were itrm^lhened by the creation, on 1 Jmnumy 1944, of the United States Strategic
A ir Forcm In Europe, a command comprising tfm Eighth A ir Force emd Hie newly
in s titu ted  Fl^ eemth A ir Fwce in Ita ly, The Combined Bomb# O^ensive, vitalised
by nsw and explicit directives, began to achieve the rewlts that hod eluded Its
pirmmers since its formation. But with the approach of OVERLORD, on orgonixotlonai
problem of greet m c^itude <^>pe#ed«
Wheth# or not the personal opinions of Sir Arthur Harris (now {olned by
the Commmding Oemsrol, United States Strategic AW Forces in Europe, Gen#al
Carl A, Spootz) w#e coirect'-^thot the right kind o f m  air o ffm ive  could stove
off the need for inveeion—the course of the war now depended upon the successful
ctxickict of OVERLŒD, It was with this imp#ot*ve before them that the C offined
Chiefs of Staff weighed every decision. And wheth# or not there was complete
accord among the principals, the decision had been mode to me the strategic oir
elem#iH in support of the invoston. This had the eoncomltemt effect of suspending 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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the original bombing proprom of the Combined Bomber Offesnive, at least until a 
secure foothold hod been gained by the liwceion forces. The question of who was 
going to commwd the bombers under this new concept became oti Issue charged 
with comideroble emotion.
Prior to this time the control of Bomb# C^rwcmd and the United States 
Strategic A ir Fore# In Europe was vwted in the Combined Chiefs of Staff through 
the Ro)ml A ir Force Chief of A ir Staff as their agerd. General Dwight D# Elsen* 
hower. Supreme Commmder, A llied Expeditionary Fmrc#, was similarly r#ponslbl# 
only to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and since he was to employ the strategic air 
forces in OVERLORD he believed strmgly that he should #@mmand them.
My inslstmce upon commarHJi^  these air forces at that time wca 
further influenced by the lesson so conclusively demonstrated at Salerno; 
when a battle needs the last ounce of available force, the oocmmnder 
must not be in the position of depending upon request and negotlatkm 
to get it, it W€0 v ita l that the entire mm of our cesoult power, including 
the two Strategic A ir F#ces, be available for use during the critical 
stcges of the attack, I stcded unequivocally that so long os I was in 
command I would accept no other solution, although I ogpeed that the 
two commmders of the heavy bombing forces would not be subordinated 
to my Tactical Air commander In chief but would receive orders directly 
from me,^
The American Oilefs of Staff did not object to Eisenhower's demand because 
the proposal was In line with their idem of achieving command of the entire opera*
^Forrest C. P«^e, The Supreme Command  ^ Vol. IV; The European Theater 
of OperotioM, United States Army in World War II, ed, K w t Robes^''(ÿreenïiel¥ ~ 
Washington* Ü.É G ove rr^n t P rw lhg' Office',' , pp. 123*137,
2Î Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe (N#v Yorks Doubleday & 
Compcmy, Inc,, 194#, p. 222.
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tîo ii. The British, however, were vîrtuolly umonlmou* In their opposition to the 
fi^reement. ^ id e  from perhaps purely notional oomiderotlims, the primwy fecr 
wm that Bomb# Commsmd's ottook upon German incbstry would be wmpromlsed 
and that the whole weight of the force would be Frittered owoy on unworthy targets 
In xipport of the Imd battle.
Both the British imd Americans were opp*%ed to the oltemote plan whereby
the elements of the UnltW States Strategic A ir Forces In Ewope and Bomb# Commmd
detached f#  the supp#t of OVERLORD would come und# Air Marshal Sir Troff#d
Leigh*Motlory, the newly appointed Ccmmond#*ln*Chlef, A llied Expeditionary
A ir F#ce, and a sub#dinate of glsenhow#, Lelg^*Molfory wm o distinguished
fig h t#  p ilo t who had led the Fight# Command, but to Harris and Spoatz, the Idea
23of placing bomb# units und# o tactical command# was unthinkable.
Eismhow# was not to be put o ff. A ff#  fruitful dbcutsiom wlHi Sir Ch#les 
Portal and Prime M inlst# Chwchill, he evolved a conqpromise solution to the pro­
blem that seemed both logical w d fa ir. The tactical f#ees would remain und# 
Letgh-Mollory, but the strategic fore# would come und# Eisenhcw# through his 
Deputy Supreme Command#, A ir Chief Mordwll Sir Arthur Tedd#. This would ovoid 
p lacif^ Harris and Spootz und# on espol and would m#ely s%4%titute llsenhow# 
for Portal os ag#it f#  the Combined O iie fi of Stc#f. In effect, Tedd# would become 
the Stqsreme Air Common^. As a pM#natlc solution the #rmgement mm excellent,
--------------- S f c jl-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and Fremklond, III, 10-41*
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but In tromlotlng the agreed policy Into direct I v# form, @ protroctod semontle 
battle arose ov# the nature of |isenhow#'i auth#ity. The Brittdi ^o#e “super­
vision,** but the Americms insisted upon "cmmmmd,** The Supreme Commander lost 
potimce and dmnmded clarification from the Combined ChieFi of Staff, saying 
that , . unless the matter Is settled at once I w ill requmst re lie f from this com­
mand, " At this point the word “ direction** was introduced cmd occiqsted. On 14
24April 1944 the outh#ity was powd from Portal to glsenhow#*
The success# of the strategic air fwces In their s%#port of OVERLORD need 
no elaboration. Tim w orkli^ orror^cment proved to be eminently p roctlW , In 
fa # , neither Siqprmne Headqucrt#s A llied Expedltlonwy Forces nor either of the 
two bond»# forces sought to t#mlnote the structure after the affairs on the Confine# 
were well In h#»d. The British A ir Staff, howmf#, desired a return to the original 
orrongement wherein the pow# &f dIrectI#* r#lded with the Comblmd Chiehi of 
Staff. The motivation wen c le # , P#fal Wtimted to again ex#cise control ©v# 
Bomb# Commcmd, The mov#lck Harris needed, In the ey# of his wp#iors, the 
r#traints achievable Hwough direct llwm of command#
Although Eiserbower tWugbt the rev#slon to be awkward mid Inefflcent, 
he diplomatically raised no ob|ection o ff#  the Combined Chiefs of Staff inserted 
a clause In the implementir^ directive **. . .which gave the demancb of the suprmne 
in Europe priw ity ov# anyth in  else that the s#ot<^lc bonbers might be
log# c it.
^Orovem and Co»., Ill, 320-322.
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required to do.
With the formal opproval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 14 September 
1944 the control of the Combined Bomber Offeniive again possed to Portal. Instead 
of solving the internal Royal A ir Force problems, the transfer only made things worse* 
The differences between Portal and Harris persisted until the end of the war, growing 
progressively worse as time passed. There was a time when it appeared that either 
Portal would have to change his ideas or enforce them--which would mean dixnis- 
sing Harris. The matter was never resolved, probably because the cure would hcwe 
been more distasteful thon the sickness. Thus the war ccsne to its final stages with 
scarcely more cohesion in the strategic bombing policies than was present at the 
start. In British circles there is strong sentiment that the post-invasion phose of 
the war was avoidably prolonged by this tragic failure of accommixkition,^^
^^isenhower, op. c it . , p. 307.
^^Webster and Franklond, III, 75-94,
CHAPTav 
BOMBING STRATEGY AND ETHICS
Not until new the end of the wor did British md Ammrloon view* on gen- 
erol bombing cqjproooh ony deyee of #mverg@nce, md then only fleetImgly* B#h 
govemmmts, from the begiming of the war, «btcried wontm attacks upon civ illw w , 
but they differed In the proetiool (p lica tio n  of their common sensitivity. The Ameri- 
earn ocbered to dgyli@f#t ottcmks with o rig id ity that, for a long period of time, wm 
almost self-b»feoting. RaHier than con^romise their u n w illir# w * to strike other 
than m ilitw y twgets (In a strict seme), they grimly occi^ed loss rotes that were 
nothing short of oHmtrophlc. The B ritld i, on the other hand, held to o broader 
understanding of what constituted a m ilitary target emd accepted the realization 
that some civilian cm uolti# would inevitcbly be su#oined by the enemy If the war 
w#e to be brought to on end at the ewi lest possible time.
That Hiere should hove been less reluctimce In Inglcmd to area bombing 
than in the IMifed States is not at a ll surprlsi#^. The blom struck against London 
during the last half of 1940 were ample proof that the Germcms IW  obonfkmed any 
fxetense of lim itU^ their attocW to purely m ilitary obfectiv#. The (W ire for re­
taliation was widespread, W lud ir^  mnoi^ its advocate# the Prime M inlst# himself.
In a minute to General lamoy on 19 Novmnber 1940 he said*
I wish to know. , .w h# i# the Worst form of f»op#tlonate retalî#îon, 
i.e .,  o y g l retaliation, that we con inff let upon ordtnmry German cities 
for e ^ t  mey mm now cteing to us by means of the peeochute mine. Todoy 
we were infomsed that thirty-six hod been chopped, but by Wmrmw it
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may be a hundred* W ell, let it be e hundred end make the best possible 
plan m  that scale for action w ithin, say, a week or ten «feq^ s. If we hove 
to west long#, so be it, but moke sure there is no obstruction.
Nevmtheiess, even with the backing of Churchill, th#e wc» resistonce 
to the action. As he commented in his ae^unt of the periods “A month later, I 
was s till pressing for retaliation; but one objection after another, moral and techni­
cal, obstructed it,
Not having hod the trying experiences of England to serve os o policy in­
fluence, the America#, when they entered the war, followed o bombing philosophy
3similar to one expressed In a book written in 1941 by Arnold and laker. In what 
was a curious mixture of naivete and hard-headed realism the author said;
A large air force w ill not require a ll of its bombers for operotiom 
c^ in s t the air force of the enemy, P##istent attacks w ill be launched 
immediately on those manufacturing establishments, power plants, mé 
I in#  of coRKnuntc#ion which are v ita l to an enemy In its attempt to 
gird hself for war. Every factory in m  enemy territory which is pro- 
ckicing a v ita l wm materiel or cm essential item of ecpipment, con ex­
pect enmny air rotcb.
There has been much discussim cèout attacks on centers of p e l­
let ion. It is generally occepted that bombing attacks on c iv il populace 
mre uneconomical mid unwise. Many of the reports In the premnf war 
in Europe of attacks on c iv il populations either ore propogcmda or due 
to mistokm identity, or inaccuracy on the pcet of the bombardier in 
the plane. Dome populatiom which reside in the v ic in ity of indus­
tria l orws, airdromes, navy yards and docks w ill undoubtedly feel 
the effects of poor bombing on those ckicks. If either of the com-
1
Churchill, op. c it . , pp* 364-365.
^feid.
3Then moj# genwol and co l# ie l, re#ectively.
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bcihxiti has engc r^ed in attacks cm people, such missions coimot be c lm ified  
other than ce decided tactical errors# The most economical way of recbcing 
o large city to Hie point of surrender, of breaking its w ill to resistance, is 
not to é r^  bombs in its streets, but to destroy the paw# plants which itqqtly 
light, the water supply, the sew# lines. N ev#, to cbite, and p # h c^ In 
no time, w ill m y  nation hove a suffle i# it air force to be cèle to w# it on 
other thon prlw ity tcegets. Hum## beings # e  not priority t#gets except 
in G#tain qscciot situations* Bombers In f#  l# g #  numb#s than # e  avail­
able today w ill be re tire d  for wiping out people in sufficient numb## to 
break the w ill of o whole no tim .^
|# l i#  in the book, two in^p#t@nt recmon# w#e cited for the failure of the
IMited Slot# to be pregMsred for ofWwive bcmbi#^ op#atiom* The first was that 
offense contravened notional policy, whidi centered upon defense. The second wm 
that th#e were unpleasant c h # a c t# lftl#  msociotW with bomb# op##i#ts* The
pomtbilities of the involvement of non-combatants ##d non-m ilit#y ob|e#*ve# was
5r^ugnant to the United States.
T h ro u ^u t most of the w #  the Am#icon# and the British retained their 
d lff# ing  ottitiKW  tow#d bombing, although in proctice the Am#ic#% c ^ o tlo w  
w#e often indistinguishable in results from the# of the British* D i^ ite  their opposite 
views, each ww r#trained to a degree by ethical #xwid#otions, some more genuliw 
than others, h it  th#e is no doubt that the w lnnlf^ of the w #  was, for eodi, the end 
obfective to which o il oth# cons!d#ations w#e seoondmy.
During the twenty yews that hove gone by since the collapse of 0#m # iy ,
H. Arnold and Ira C. Eok#, Winged W#fdre #4ew Y #k; Hons# & 
Broth#*, 1941), pp. 133-134.
^Ib ld ., pp. 8-9.
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mm of the pwslilentiy that has bedevil#! the m lliW y em iy#
he# been Ibet of tW right##### or w re i^e s i of the ge#wml WWsleg ef Gemm# eitles.
A review of this queet e# W of ii^erest today beoeuse Hie l#ue I# eeetrelly InvWvW 
In eentemperery debote over mlUtory strotegy—omd new, o# then, the meroi Issue I# 
highly reievont, lo t be&re tuning to m ##oifW  «ose history $» old In wnèWondWg 
the p t^ e m , three prelWWory Wk#erv#lon# dwwW be mode#
The first I# tW , d$#^^d*ng the fW  tW  the Gmmoni storW  the wor, the 
oulpWblllty far unrestrleted bombing «on be e ^ l t y  #W h#d to three of the flim  mohtr 
€afldbel(mti--0#Nrim»iiy, Great Britoin and the United Sfsdes* A ll three w^toged it» 
ore# b o rà li^  wh#» it suited Ifie ir Werest#, in spite of o ffic ia l poiWy sWements to 
the eanlrory, And It is assuredly true that hod Japm and Rustle be#» #p#lpped wlHi 
elromft wltobl# far lon#-rong* ^e re tim s, thsy too would hove den# so. The f t #  
seem to hove bem that ebstrw  or mwel eensldmsthms w #e d # n lt* ly  lees of o 
restraint tbm  were qperatWnol «%fom#ana«s# In brW , Wwm It was apersdkmally 
lid ^ lb S e  to do preeislon bwdbl#^, mm  bonéilf^ was the only altenW lve short W no 
bW ting at a ll.
The seemW poW  deserving of mention Is that the Allied bombing pollsq^ was
fmt 0 poHoy b id  deem by m ilitary men, but by their goverrmwts. At the Omabtonea 
sonfermee of 19# It hod been stlpulohsd tW  the two tifsdm io olr fare#, wodilng 
n e th e r, dmuld oebieve “ die pro#m lve destruotktn end dlsleesdlon of the 0em m  
military, W u#W l end eeonamla system and the undeseslning o f Hm morale W the 
German pm ^le to the poW where their oopcmlty far armed rraWonoe Is W elly
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#eokm#d. Tbit required end received the epprevcl ef FmHdent
Roosevelt and Prme Minister C h u rc h illW ith  guidance of this kind, the leaders 
of Bomber Command and the United States Strategic A ir Forces had # p l*c it strc^eglc
direction and, at the some time, wide latitude within which to choose both their
targets and tact*#.
The lost factor to be brought to fore is the often shadowy distinction between 
area md precision bombing. Certainly one useful criterlw» to shwpm this distinction
could be that of intent. Tdcen clone, however, dependence upon this #%e criterion 
could be misleading. While the aiming point of o given striking force may have been 
associated w ith an identlfieble and precise point of geogro{Hiy, the results of the mis­
sion could in no real sense be predicated upon the chceacter of the ob|(Kt#ve, and 
this for three reasons. (1) The probability of adverse weatlier obscuring the target, 
totally or port lo lly , decreased the assurance of precision bombing by a factor directly 
proportional to the extent of the cloud cover. (2) Bombing accuracy under combat 
conditiom did not approach the accuracy inherent in the bombing equipment and 
attainable In o training environment. (3) The location of the target was important. 
If, for instance, on aiming point wm a marshalling ywd in the middle of a built-up
résidentiel créa, tne selection of that particular aiming point could, without undue
^Quoted In Webster cmd Franklond, II, 23.
^Ibid.
The Eighth A ir Force used a plonnti^ circular error o f 1000 feet for com­
bat bombing altitudes over ^ ,0 0 0  feet and under visual sighting condltiom. (The 
Army Ah Forces, Tab C to Air War Flsoytiiy Document 42, 9 Sep 42, on file  in the 
ÜSAF Historical ArchSveiT^fl^'m^elI ' A l o l x m a '"fha average circular err# 
for blind bonèii^ was oppnmimotely two miles. (Crovm and Cate, III, 723.) Com­
pare those figures with the results of a simulated combat mission flown by the auth# 
during training. (See Appendix 2.) The circular error for that pwtlcuW  mission— 
152 feet—was generally representative of the accuracy achieved by student bombar­
diers (Wring traini#% mid prior to joining operational units.
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cynicism, be eomidered @ euphemism h r  somewhat Wooder effectives.
With these Idem serving m m  introduction, a greater appreciation of the 
issue con be gained by examining one pcrticulor operation that hw aroused feeling 
and exjfxe^ions of umisuol depth*
On 13 Februmry 1945 three raids—two British cmd one Amerio®»—destroyed 
the ancient c ity of Dresden, The most retîcèle estimates have placed the number of 
fatalities rewlting from the attack at 135,OCKh—almost twice os many deaths at hove 
been attributed to the edomic attack on Hiroshima.^
White slaughter of such magnitude de fi#  Imcginatlon, the estimate of 
casualties is in a sense statistical <md of lesser imporWnce them the question of 
whether or not the < ^ tfis , whotev# their number, were necessary at a ll. In the 
opinion of David Irving, they were not. In a highly Interpretive book that if, 
nevertheless, based up## nwticulous research, he concluded thcd, at the time of 
the attack, tlw  strategic in^ortanee of Dresden was “s#srcely morgirmi. “ Not only 
was the city undeffmded (a fact not em ily cocmrtoineèle by the Allies) and free of 
major lndu#ry, but the war had progressed to a point In time where any city that 
had not, by then, acquired strategic signlficcmee wm unlikely to do so in the 
future.
^Davld Irving, The Destruction of Dresden (New Yorks Holt, Rinehart
and WImton, 196%, p. 216, 
’ ^ Ib id ., pp. 69-77.
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Such apeculotW, heavily weighted w ith the wisdom of hInAlght, ccm 
do no more th®i to threw o reminding gWe i^ »on the tragic noture of ww Itself— 
nor is It suggested hmre that Irv ii^  has Intended to do more then that. I f  the holo­
caust of Dresckn Is c # t os o ghostly m*#ake. Hie lesson Is for today and tomorrow. 
No just purpose wmitd be served by trying to find o scap#$^»at. (|M#aIses of that 
nature ore oftm  welcome because they provide a subconsolous avenue far the 
sheddli^ of on# own diore of the rmlleetlve gu ilt.) Thirqp known today could not 
hove been known then, and dectsioiw mode In the time of war cannot be analyzed 
today e xc ^ t w ithin on understcsKlif^ of the psychological matrix that surroimded 
their making.
The reosom f#  Dresden ere not to be found In cram Imensltlvlty to hwnsm 
«offering, nor, most certainly, in calculated savagery. Instead, if historical re­
cords reflect the truth, the attack wm an event whose occursmce ccm be traced to 
I u ltim ate m ilitm y db|e€tiv«e.
Early in 1945 a sense of dlscourogemeW pervorWd the headqumters of the 
United Stotm Strategic A ir Forcm in Eiwope. The strategic offensive had been in­
terrupted for a month stmting in the middle December, 1944, so that the bonèers 
could render tactical mslstmce to the beles#*#ed ground fmrces in the Ardennes. 
Even though tW t operation, the Battle of the Bulge, had had o favorable conclusion, 
freeing the bombers for return to their primary duties, the end of the wm was not 
yet in sight. The month of rmplte hod allowed ttie Germcm o il industry to produce 
sufficient &el for the Luftwaffe fa operate its deadly jet fighters with wnslderoble
57
effectIveneit* Aftd of no soloce wm o letter sent from Owierol 4moW to Generot
Spootz which echoed from the homehont the some pessimlwn thot wot bu lld ii^
I I
within the theoter. The letter rood In port;
We hove & superiority of ot lemf 5 to 1 now c^ ln s t Germony and yet.
In # ite  of o il our hopes, ontlcipotions, éreoms end plom, we hove os yet 
not been daje to capitalize to the extent which we should* We may not 
be cèle to Farce cc^itulotl#» of the Germom by oir cdtocl», but on èe  
other hand, with this tremendous strikiiqi power, it would seem to me that 
we èoutd get much better cmd much more decisive results them we mm 
ge ttif^  now. I cm not criticizing, because frankly I don't know the 
omwer end wh# I am now doing Is letting my thoughts run w ild  with the 
hope that out of this you may get o glimmer, o light, o new th o u ^ t, or 
something whicè w ill help us to bri*% this wear to a close racmer.
Faced with Hits situation, a reepproisol of the strategic target system hod 
to be undertaken. A rev trad set of priorities was developed by Gmrarol %oat% and 
A ir Morshot Bottomley In Jomiory, 19#, but there was little  #mre to the revision 
them minor chcmges in emphrais# OH s till headed the list, followed by lines of 
cofmnunicotlon, and, for the Royal A ir Force, blind attacks e##inst InckiWriol 
®eos.^^
A signiflramt developmmt come ot the end of the monHt when the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff met at Motto prior to the YolW ommference. There the m ilitory chief» 
decided to d iift the strrdegic ottock to the east in order to pravmt German reinforce­
ment of the ropidly deterioroting fr##t. Additionally, they f#<èobly m ticlpoted 
thot the Russians w w ld solicit such support at the FeWuory conference. The o ffm -
^^Crov#» <md Cate, III, 715.
p. 716. , pp. 717-722.
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$iv0 we» to bo W nëiod agolmt tbora frcmtportatlon contori thot loy othwwt the 
woitmt» qpprooohe* to the Ec^om Fmnt. A coroHory benefit to be goined was the 
oreotion of panic and concision in the cities thot would hopefully put strong pres­
sure upon Hitler to end the wor. Dr#den was one of the oM»oi#ed cities.
Reo#ion within Germany to the Dresden ottock was stridently bitter. 
Goebbet's |Mrop(^ |e»ida mochine drogged out of the disaster evwry cmiceivoble od- 
vontc#®. The common theme In o il o f Hie broodcwts to the outside world, both 
from the stcdions inside Germany csid from those c lcm ^tine  stotlom outside of the 
country, w #  the occus#lon of terror tactics.
Soon the prewes of the neutrol muntries were reporting detailed verslom 
of whot hod happened In Drraden. But of greater Importance were the reactions 
within the United Stotes md Great Britain. In Hm United States the Secretary of 
W® hod to be briefed concerning the strotegic signlflwnce of Dresdm ond of the 
desire of the ftussicms to hove It neutrolized. And o g^eot flurry of telegrams went 
bock emd forth between Wodilngton ond Hie hewlqmsrters o f the United States Stra­
tegic A ir Fmrces mktng for aiwl receiving ossuronc# th #  only c lo v e d  bombing 
tactics w®e beiiqi employed.
In Greet Britain the reaction, though deloyed, wo# severe. The days 
fo liow ii^  Dresden sew m  upswing In the fortunes of the A llies. The prasimism
H b id ., pp. 724-731. 
Irving, op. ,U . , p. 222. 
end Cede, III, 731.
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thot hod cqspeored offer the Bottle of the Bulge turned to rp le t (^tlm lm . The o il 
offereive oonduoted by the United Stotes Strotegic A ir F#ces cmd, reluctantly, by 
Sir ^ h u r  Hearts hegm to produce the desired results, ond the Icaid forces swept on 
towwd Berlin cmd the ecnt. A ll o f these th ir ^  ccxnbined to rotse doubts in the mind 
of the Prime Minister os to the need for Farther strategic oir opwotiom, ond in 
penrticul®, heovy generot bombing. Accordingly, on 28 Mwch 1945 he pn^iored 
the following minute for the Chiefs of Stoff Committee ond the Chief of A ir Strrff*
it  seems to me thot the moment h#  come when the gestion of bomblr% 
of Germon cities simply for the soke of inweoslng the tmrcr, though under 
other pretexts# èould be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control 
of m  utterly ruined land. We shell not, for Instance, be able to get hous- 
ii^  materials out of Germany far our own needs because some temporary 
provision would hove to be ma#W far the Germom themselv#» The destruc­
tion o f Dresden remoins a serious query ogatiwt the #>nduct o f A IIW  bomb- 
tr^, I am of the opinion that m ilitary dbjectîves must hencefwth be more 
strictly studied In our own interests rather than that of the enemy.
The Fmrei^ Secretary hm spoken to me on this sub{eet, ®id I feel the 
need far more precise cxmcmnftotion upon m ilitary objectives, sucé os o il 
and communications behind the immedicde bottle-zcme, rather than on 
mere acts of terror and want#» destruction, however impressive.
AlHiough the underlying motive of the #xnmun leaf ion was without doubt 
proper, the manner of its fdirasing ww a cruel cmd unwcnrrcnited thrust at the Royal 
A ir Force. In his unveiled oritieism of Dresden, Churchill totally ignored the fact 
that on 26 Jonucyy 1945 he had d i^ të ie d  on umswolly curt minute to the Secretwy 
of ^ote far A ir, Sir Archibald Sinclair, demcmdlng to know when Berlin and "^her 
l®ge cities in East Germany** w#e to be brought under attack. Not only was Hie 
ottriW tion of blame for the ïkm dm  attack unfair, but it constituted a Wood in­
dictment of the bonèing policy which the govwnment had consistently approved far
^^Web#®'md Rwklond,' 'I I I " "" " '
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Hie mmy yeon of Bomb# Commond's operation# over Gemony. When the Prime 
MlnWer received wmd of Hie dtslrett hi# mlmite hod oooosloned within Bomber 
CormwaW, it h to his eredlt thot he owised it  to be withdrown in favor of one more 
felleltom iy worded#
O f the memy ottltude# and c^inlora oonc#ned with the ethloot oqteets of 
general bombardment, m é\ of the cH f^lolol hist®lee of the Stratégie A ir Offensive 
mntain# a prasoge that seems, for Its own service, to capture what was both the 
essmce and the reality o f Its country's belieff# These bear repetition.
First, from the Americcm hlstmyi
In General Spaatz's mind, “beating up the insides of G#mcmy“ meant 
m  more Him the Intenslflcotim of a well-omcelvod program of HWeglc 
bombwdmmt, but thmre wen no diorF%e of propwols ffont ® h# sources for 
qpeclol emqaloym## of the ov#wh@lmlr% air pew# at the di^osol of the 
A llied commtW. Some of Hie propraols were BrItiHi In w lg ln orW some 
wmm American, md some of them tmded to beconm on Imue between the 
AAF and the RAF* Especially wm this true of proposals to bomb Germany 
so tm rlfylngly H #  it would we for peace. . . .A ll proposals ffonkly aimed 
ot breaking the mmole of the Germcm people met the comWent opposition 
of Gen#ai Spcmtz, who r^aeotedly raised the moral Wsue Involved, cmd 
AAF Head^tcarteri In Wcohli^ton strongly s*q»ported him on the ground# 
that suëi qperatiom were eontiwy to a ir force policy and national Ideals.
On more tlmm one occasion ElsmAow# backed Spootz's Insistence thot 
his own forera be sent only against what he mmsl<W«d legitimate m ilitary 
target. At t lim ,  SHAIF yIelcM  to other premures.
Second, §mm the B r it#  history:
The conckict of the #rat@glc air offensive had long been redded with 
smplcion by sections of public opinion In Britain. It was generally regarded 
as morally l^ itlm a te  to hcmh s tra t^ lc  <è|ectîv«s such os factories, o il
% W ., pp. 95-119. 
^^Croven and C ot., Ill, 638.
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plrnitf, éùekyméi and railway e##r@#, even if  $hW did Incldently iwufe 
severe destruction of residentIql oreos #W of civilian life  mé I I# *  On 
the other hand, the view tfmt it was m®ally legitimate to bomb residen­
tia l area, even If the ob|ect wm to recbce m ilitary m  industrial activ ity, 
wm frmpmntly chollens#, and the more sppmrent It became that in the 
m a ^ lty  of its major mm  ottadd. Bomber Ommond wm, In fact, oWing 
at the cm tr#  of the residential areas, the more prmounced the protests 
became. In dealing with these chal1e%# and with the many motions ##- 
quirlee which he received, the $##et®y of State for A ir was naturally 
placed in a sramvh# dbf ic#e and d ifficu lt pralfism* It wee imFsrtimote 
that he had to contend with such o widespreW md de^rooted i^ mremce 
of the opm ttlm ol problems InvolvW* A ll the some, many of thcee who 
exprrased anxiety sèmit the objects of strategic bombim were highly re- 
tponslWe people whose motives could w t be In doubt. ^
M  a bo lm w  to these vlmm, a stnmge but sobering #%^Wion 1$ to be 
found In a post-w® book written by a man who wra the Inqaector 0en#al of Fire 
Prevention In Germany. Quoting a french m llltm y writer, he mwrW a relotionèïp 
between the Nuremberg trials and the bonèïng of Germany:
The brais of the proce» wra settle in advance: the enemy hod to be 
wrong* The sight of the vast ruins IW  thrown the victors into a p w ic , 
cmd they were afraid* The enemy had to be w f® ^—think of what the 
world would look like if  he were not I How intolercèly heavy the leaden 
weight ^  conscience would rest cm us for a ll thora towra we remed to the 
groundl^
Aprat From forcing a real izatlm  of the utter uselessness of modem wcrfra®, 
the DrWen episode tells another story, one that speaks more to the future than to 
the prat. It is simply this. When one r^ords the tenrWe devastation of Drraden, 
the thought Immediately occurs that the pattern could have been repeated through-
^%^daster cmd Frcmklcmd, III, 114*
21Hans Rurqpf, The Bcmblim of Genecny, trons. Idwrad Fitzgerald 
(New Yrak# Holt, R iW w f ohd'WhwiK ' 225*
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out Grammy. If H%# Am trlcm  m d fc r it#  forms Hod oo#inod—oorly In th# 
to i^em o tloo lly  do#roy ooeh Gormm city of over 100,000 WwèltmW, thrae I# 
little  evldmee to thot it  oowld not Hove been done. WHetHra or not tW
course of octîon would hove led to m  eorller victory Is open to con|e#ure. Whot 
if  wpremely W ^ortW , Ixqrond sterile # e e u l# W  ebout edi# might hove h*q»pened, 
is th #  the Allies deltberefely #o*e not to fu lfill their potradlol o f de#ructlm . 
Their choim wos m boon to humonlty.
CHAPTIR VI 
MEN AND MACHINES 
During the period between th© end of W®ld W® I and the begînnii^ of 
World W® II, the c^ iio o tio n  of teehnolcgy to the soîenoe of worfdr© wra not o 
popul® occupation. Stultified by their obsession with th© doctrines of the prat, 
th© m illtcry leaders of Ae period foiled to put to use th© techniques raid odvraicra 
mode by their scientific contemporrarles.  ^ The wcr began with wecqram that were, 
relatively speaking, hardly odvonced at o il from tWcraicludIng days of Wrald W® I# 
In Great Britain, ckqslt© the Wiowle<%e that H ltl#  wra reramIng #  an 
alarming pace, there wra widespread and rbeam-llke uncemcern. Late In July,
1936, Winston Churchill fe lt obliged to warn the government that m  emergency 
existed. He estimated that at least two years would ©Icpse before the procbction 
of ormranents could reach minimally occeptcèl® figures—and even then the stocks 
would be hopelessly è o rt of war-time needb.^
Across the orarai th© situatlcm wra worse* When Franklin D, Roosevelt 
took office In 1933, the United States Army ranked seventeenth among those of the 
world. Isolationist smtlment dranlnated the notlrawl mood and the sowrlty of the
^When Sir Arthur Hrarls attended the Royal Army Staff 0»llege In 19S  ^
he wra qppolied by its conservatism. . .The n^tfo of the pi w e  wra 'be ortWdox 
or praish*; and being rathodox wMored to mean W d ii^  on to evray traiet o f wra- 
for© tW  hral turned out to be a busted flush between 1914 cmd 1918 raid lgnralr% 
a ll subsequmt teduiicol ckwelopment.** frtrarls, op. c it . ,  pp. 24-25.)
^Churchill, I, 681-687.
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Iw d wra lo the bug gum of the novy.^
Each country b # , however, profltted to o degree From the experienora 
of World Wor I ond hod given some attention to the place of air power in future 
wor$. Urxbrstandeèly, the Interest wra grradW among those m ilitary men who had 
been directly rasooloted with the formative period of m illtray aviation.
In the United States the proponents of air power hod chrated a w e ll- 
ordered eoia^. three objectlvra were of mo|or significance* an independent air 
trace; occ^tm c# of the doctrine of strategic bombardment; and an aircraft oopabte 
of the strategic ro le.^ These mnbltlora were oontinuolly fru$tr#ed by the subordina­
tion of the Air Corps to the Army, lecorae W th# arrmgrammt the assigned roira 
of the A ir Cor;» wrae direct support of the Army cmd ooWol defense ^  the notion.^ 
N e ith# of thrae wra regraded by the air leocbrs m  being o f primary Importraice, 
although the latter trak fmd w ithin it the seeds of a bomber |xrogram of unhraalded 
size.
In iom iory, 1931, rai c^eenient hod Wen mode between Oraierol Douglas 
MacArthur, Army Chief o f Staff, and Admiral WllUcm V . Pratt, Chief o f Naval 
Operations, which called o truce to the d i^ te  over the role of air powra in c o o ^ l 
defense. The terms of the agreement gave the A ir Corps specific respans&Hities
®Mrak S. Watson, Chief of Staff t Prewra Plra# and Préparât lorn, Vol.
VI of United States Army w W raB'W # II,
tons U.S. Government Printing O ffice, 195%, pp» 24-25.
"^Craven and Cate, I, 17.
% W ., p. 68.
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to defend against hostile naval elements. In order to fu lfill this role a suitable 
aircraft had to be provided—a requirement that ultimately bore fruit m the B-17 
long-range bomber. Thus, when the United States entered the war, the production 
lines for a first-class bomber were in operation.^
The early problems of the Army Air Forces^ can be summarized in one 
word—shortoges. Even though President Roosevelt began the expansion of the Air 
Corps in 1939, the weeks and months after Pearl Hwbor were filled  with the frus­
trations that arose from not having what was needed to do the job at hand. The 
plea of the President for in itia l production of 50,000 planes a ye® wra more rhe- 
traicol than it was a goal that could be met by the aircraft industry, even under 
optimum conditions.
A most vexing problem was the development of a program to synchronize 
the production of aircraft with airfield construction and aircrew training. At no 
time was there a static plan. News from the theaters stimulated expanded require­
ments; combat experience dictated urgent modifications and spec fications were in 
constant flux. To keep up with the frenetic pace of events the entire methodology 
of procurement had to be changed. Departing from painfully meticulous paper 
routines, hraried officials adopted “ judicious shortcuts** and the telephone became 
an instrument of life-saving effectiveness. Perhaps the q ix jlity  of production de­
clined, but quantity in time of need wra adequate coqiporaation.®
^Craven and Cate, I, 30 , 61-67.
^The Army air establishment wra so designated on 20 June 1941 (Craven 
and Cate, I, 11%.
8
Craven and Cate, I, 104-110.
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lv # i hod th® qlrraaff m lW  out of Hie fW rale* onto prepared a irfie ld i 
oik! Into the hcaidi of tfoined air ground crews, two other prob(#ra hod to be 
faced. First, the desperate requirements of Hie toyol A ir Force demanded on op* 
portionment of the rmomom* This, of course, memt that certain American units 
were derived of their equipment, which in turn delayed their entry i##o combat 
operations. Second, #%®t from betiq; used in tfolfilng units, the bombers wore 
ineffective w#H they hod been flown oversera to Hieoter locotlom. Fra Inmcpe- 
rienced youths only w e ^  out of flying schools, the prrapect of Iraig hours over Hws 
wnffiendly Atlantic In an ynfamilira oircroft wra o #cllonging ami#went. But for 
those who lonckd safe In liq jland, their real rackol had just b ^ n .
Austere peocetWe budgets Wd equipped the Royal A ir Force B c#er 
Commrmd with what Sir Arthur Honrlf called a “shop window" force. It wra a fraoe 
utterly locking In depth, which, when war come, found itself faced with the dil 
of being, on the one hand, uneèle to field opraotional units without taking çravs 
cmd equipment owoy ffom the sorely needbd tro k ili^  program, or on the raher hand, 
to reduce Aront-llne strength by withdrawing crews for training codrra. Hod not the 
period of the "pWny war" allowed time for the build-up of Bomber Ccmmsmd, the 
subsequent year* of cperctkm* against Germcmy would have been vastly dlf&rent. 
Even Hien, the mraiths of respite were a ll too sW rt.^
Contrray to early expectatiraw, the few bombers ovotliè ie for attacks on 
Gramrai forces were umèle to opercde effectively In the (kiytime. Aside from their
Û
Harris, op. c it. , pp. 34-45.
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short rcK^e, th© bombers were hratdico{^d by defensive ramoment s>##m thot heé 
limited fields of coveroge—o deficiency soon recognized by the Luflwoffe whose 
pilots shifted their otfocks to se#ors that ovoided the defensive firepower of the
|A
bombers. Equolly discourogtr^ wra lock of wlf-seollng fuel tcmks# Without them 
tanks, one bullet oeuld send o bomber down in flames. It wra mot until a ll of the 
fighter units hod been equifqaod with the tonks that o re tra it progrom was undkHrtaken 
to benefit the bomber squo&ora.  ^^
Progressively higher Irases, coupW with indignation at the Oeneon bomb­
ing of Coventry ond London, led to a d iift in s tro t^y . Daylight precision ottocki 
were obcmdoned and Bomber Cwm wd turned to night action. Imphral* i^ aon spe­
c ific  oim it^ points dk(^^d  off, and by November 1941 area tragets were regularly 
selected.
With the shift in strategy to night operations a new problem wra inkraWwd— 
the very great d ifficu lty  in navi^ting  from EnglraW to a point over Ommmy where 
the bombs could be released with a degree of certainty that they would fa ll upon 
their target. Lord Cherwell, the Prime Minister's scientific advisor, <btermli»ed
^^hra% he cramonded No. 5 Group, H#rl# remWIed this problem by 
contracting Far Improved turr#s from o nearby manufacturer without going through 
normal wpply chcmnels* Bureaucratic IndlgraHlon wra high, but the results w#e 
fflqxrrasive (Hrarls, op* c it#, pp. 39-4%.
 ^^Sauitdby, op. c it. , p. 76.
12
Soun#y, c it., pp. 110-111.
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th#  twQ-thirè of the crews failed to drop their bombs within five miles of the 
eralgned t®get. The ted in im i difficulties of the navigator had not received the 
soma attention from the scientific community as hod the problem of the figh t#  
p ilo t, for the very obvious reason of “putting first th li^  fim t.
The early failure to gain air supremacy over the Luftwaffe resulted In 
heavy attrition of crews and airraoff. This one failure was. In point of fact, the 
key Inadequacy of both Bomber Commmd and the Eighth A ir Force*
In order to secure the protection afforded by evraion and ruse, Bomber 
Command wra dm W  the cè lilty  to achieve Hie necessary concenWtlan 
emd accuracy, raid In order to achieve the necessary raancentrotirai raid 
accuracy, the Eighth A ir Force wra denied the protect Irai given by evralon 
and ruse*
Sir j^ thu f Harris believed sincerely thot massive assault# against ma{ra 
cities, If pumied without diversion would bring the GermraW to heel, bb  Invasion 
would be required; only occupation. The Americans were not so scuigu inc. They 
bel W ed that invasion wra a precondition of eucce#, Crairaquently the bombli^ 
opraotlora shmild be directed o^alnst the Luflwoffe and its supporting iiW stry on 
o “round-the-clock" basts* The British Air Staff hod not the sran# optimism os 
Harris. Its senior officers were of the In Ion that unless German aircraft production 
were ewrtelled, the build-up of night fighters might. In the end, defeat Bomber
^%he Erarl o f BIrkradiead, The Profeyy ramd èe  PrWe Minister# The 
O ffic ia l Life of Frofessra* F, A, LindSsènnrVlsSïm  üierw elf '"'ÿlSHraiî" "tloughtrai
R rm % T ra 9 m y r i ^ ^  --------------------------------------
^Webster raid Fronkictnd, U l, 294. 
^%orrls, op. c it* , p. 263.
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Cormncmd, Hence ihe Air Stoff sided with the Atnmrloont and directed Fkrris to 
lend weight to the effort against the aircraft Industry.
For mraiy mraiHis the results were unrewrading. The Royal Arr Force hod 
not yet developed its night bombing technique* to the point where higfj occurocy 
cXHild be expected. The United States Army A ir F®ce$ were cranmitted to doyllgW 
bombing, cmd their sorties agoW  deep tragets proved too costly to be r^teoted 
with any cmsistency, thereby m inim izli^ the overall effects because the Germans 
were cèle to moke those repairs a ltic a l to sustained {production.
The real reason for the succession of failures (American in (aortlcul®) wra 
the lock of long-rmge escort fightras. Kmnving the vulnereèif tty of Hie bombers 
without escort, the Luflwgffe held off raigc^ing the formations until the racrat 
fighters were forced by ffiel shorten© to break off ond return to their brara, Tlie 
Germcm pilots then {pressed home savage and well-coordinated attacks against the 
bombers a ll the way to the target mm  cmd thence back again to the pick-up point 
where rendezvous wra to be made with the escorts d l^ tch e d  to guord the bombers' 
return. Hot until long-rra^e escort fighters were mode available did the situa­
tion chcmge. When this Ixqapened, ond ra the blows to the German o il iraWtry 
coused raiticol Hxirtagra In ov lotion fuel, the pow# of Hi® Luftwaffe declined.
W ebster ond Frraiklrad, II, 5*6.
^^Adolf Gollond, The FW  oral the Lrati The Rise ond Foil of the Getmcm
FWiter Fracei, 1 ^ -1 9 4 5 , "w m rM m vy^  Y®ky''"Hwy Hblf c IT
CraipoSy, 1.
’®lbid., pp. 204-210.
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Th® off®mîv0 agoîrssfr Germort încbstry failed diamally dufimg dcarbt®$$
and during day llÿ if whm v is ib ility  was <è#cur®d by elouds. Then both Bomber
Cmrnnond and the Eighth A ir Fore® hod to depend  ^ for any sort of précision, upon
radar. Although by 1944 ninety per cent of the British heavy bombers wwe e^ul^ied
with a type of radar known as H2S, the state of the technology wc® such that ac**
curate results could not be expected. The American equipment 042X**-a mods*-
fied H2S) wm a little  more accurate but In very ësort s u p p l y # Th e  resulH, o ft#
a fu ll year of <^eratioii, were dlsc^poinfli^. The blind bombing raids accompli^ed
little  fmxre tlwm to keep ^essure on the eneroy—itself a goal of the POINTKANK
plan-"-but without the precise attacks upon the Wx)b{ectlves that would have 
21meas# succe»*
There were other l#s important problem that hindered the Combined 
Bomber Offensive, but their effects w #e In Wg® measure overcome by the sheer 
weight and p^sistency o f the bombing <^Msratims. Nwnbered omor^ these problww 
wmre aircraft shortage in the Joint recormaissemce programf^ early tW inlcal
d lfflo iltle s  in photo-*fnt@rpretation that rwulted in inaccuract© &mage ossessmmt;^
and Frankiand, IV# 14.
February 1944 only fiftems otrcraft were fitted with the equipment. 
Consequently one bcxnber served as leader for sixty others without radar, whose 
bombardiers relwsed upon sl#$ol from the leocbr (Oroven and Cate, 111, 14-20).
^^Craven and Cote, III, 14-20.
H. Arnold, Global Mlwion (New York# tWper & Brothers, 1949),
p . 377.
^^ebste r md ftronklond. III, 211.
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and poor on&wne# (dsouf fourteen per cent of the American bombs were d e fe c t iv e )  .^4 
in addition to the afsx'ementioned, there ww the problem of communication between 
the militcny cntd the civtlkm  scientists whose talents has been cbown into the t# o l 
wcnr effort.
World Wmr U wc® without doubt the most m’uciot and com ply m^perotlve 
venture ever undertaken by hmmm beings. Because of the total nature of the war, 
many individuals were involved, some directly mé othem indirectly, who In earlier 
perlotb would have ol%@rved from the fringes of the wm o. in the first group were 
the civiliOBW who were affected by bombing ottacksi in the semnd p*oup were the 
scientists. These, said Sir Henry Ttzard, only just before the wc® **. . .were called 
in to study the neecb of the Services, os distinct &om their wonts. . .and then only 
os a last resort. . . .
The problems of the air services dmnrmded o proportionately Iwge shore 
of scientific talent—then, as now, a voludble comnmdlty. Nowhm^e was the need 
greater than in con|unctlon with the Combined Bomber Offensive. Apart firom the 
pure migineertng problems associated with inqsrovement of o iroa ft and equipment, 
an entirely new discipline was born from the need to predict and assess bombing re­
sults—a specialty roughly described os “operations analysis. “ AlMwugh Hie connota- 
tim  is one of an “a##r-the-fact“ c ro is a i, sudi was fear from the case. Oftentimes
^^Craven and Ode, HI, 795.
^^^uoted by R. V . jones in “Science smd the State,® hkiture. Vol. 200, 
No# 4901 (Octobw 1963), 7-14. Sir Henry T iw d  was the leading KfWtih figure 
In the development of radar.
72
the pdgmmt» of the m oly*# (who would, for ImtcMice, #ugg#t tcnget Wegwle# 
ond p rW itW  dmrlved ftom theoretiool ooloulotkHH, there being no emplrtool 
stomdmrds to go by.
into sudti det#mlnotion# went the mmbined wisdom o f stotlstleions, earn- 
om iiti, geogre^mrs, photogronmietrto, end score# o f other specWllsts. The pro­
ducts of their delibwrotiom wore fundamWolly oWroct mé hod to be Integpoted 
with both fnllltory expediency md m liitsry copobility to then become volid ww 
ob|ectives.
Ikttrolnod os they were in the somewhat rigid pottems of milItcary thought, 
the scientists often di#mr@d among themselves and w ith their m littery associates. 
These w#e not a lto ^ th ^  peevidi bickerings; in some Instance tW y becsme sub­
stantive isw ^ of high policy.
One of the most noteworthy examples of this d ivisW  of thought raised 
^rove éauW sèout the m tlre  s tro t^ lc  bombing effort. It was the clwh In England 
between Lord Charwell and Sir Hemry Tirord over the Imue of crea bomblr^.
Cheiweil held that Imlving the bombing error would hove the net effect 
of doubltr^ the slate of the bomber fo rc e .^  Af^fylng this reasoning to Omrmcm 
populations and productim centws, he postulated a A m #e  index that could be 
used in e s tim a tif the results to be achieved by m y given attack. Tlxord disagreed,
26Ct P. Snow, Science md Government (Cw#idm% Harvard Ikshrersity 
Press, 1961), pp. 47-^53. '
^ R . V . jones, “Emotion, Science md the Bomber O^mwive,® The 
listener 00  November 1961).
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claiming that the Index was five times too high, which, if true, would have dis­
credited the entire bomber offensive.^
The view of CHetwetl prevailed* (And it Is orguciale that even hod llmmé 
been demonstrably correct, the mood of the British people would not hove sanctioned 
a reversal of the bombing policy.) The point of the ddsote that Is Instructive to the 
historicm, how^m'. Is that this difference in scientific interpretation became a 
&enzy of emotion mvà provided both the bottls^pound and the wmnunition for the 
prqKMients and exponents of olr power to w o ^  a private battle sepcrote from, #%d 
damaging to, the prwecution of the main strife. "The persisting lesson is that, 
even when we try to be dbfectlve and detached, emotion cmd self-inter## frequently 
enter into our dec Worm, be they p o litiW , m ilitary, or sc im tlflc .
To soy that the technological fxobtems of the Ccmblmsd Bomber Offensive 
had no effect upon the outcome of the wmr would be Inaccurate* But likewise to 
say that their e^ect was ever of a ma^itude to cent doubt upon the ultimate victory 
of the Allies wm#ld be similarly in error. Some would perhopi mifgest that the end 
of the war ww delayed cppreclr&ly by the technical di#iculties thot caused In­
accurate, and therefore ineffective, bombli^* Others might advance the more ex- 
trmne view that the air situation was in a sense Immotmrlal bemuse the central issue 
was decided by the great struggle between the land camimi. The truth probably lie# 
mmewhere in between.
^Snow, op. c it. ,  p. 49.
29Jones, The Listenw (30 Novembm  ^ 1961).
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY
In the decade preeedir^ the onW erf World Wor H the odvence of aviation 
technology hod fixxb pw*&le the <Wel<qment o f airmoft sultdble, for heavy homb- 
sng operafim , md the m ilitary doctrlnw of the day wme fufFlclm tly Wvonced to 
give nmre than lip  service to the conc^t of strategic homhordment. But when the 
war started both the Royal A ir Force Bomber Command m d the United States Army 
A ir Forces were mreod^ for the roles #$ey were fore-orrWlned to play* The failure 
of both governments to accurately conos the dweots which hmed thmi hW hod the 
direct effect of denying to their air s# v ic ^  the olfmslve copobilitis® that could 
have, albeit with #)me sacrifice, bem attained, Consespently, when die need 
arose for a force-in-being to send ogairot Germany, there mm only available thot 
force sufficient to strike k h m  whose w eîÿit wm little  more than syndsolle.
These ©Hbrts bolstered Allied morale but did little  to Interfere with the 
progress of Hitler*# wcsr. Not until late in the mm did the bclmce d ilft from a des- 
perote struggle for swvlvol to a smdltion of unequivocal mW unalterable superiority*
The ou#ere begirmlngs, the mwlng years of uncertainty, md the clmwt 
apocalyptic flmidi whlWi marked the bomber operatlom have provickd the cqaponent 
m d proponent of a ir power alike with a wide range of historical incident to support 
their various y\m/$ (tome mctreme in their construction). This same wealth of evi- 
dmce, mwmined in part in the cow## of this study, cm  be called upon to support 
the conclusion that. In gmerol, the potm tial of die bomber effort wm ^eater than
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ît# achievement. This l« not to suggest, however, that weighed c ^ lm t the scale 
of available evlrfence, the achievement can be judged to be 1 ^  than m e of the 
truly decisive factors In the victory over Germany. ^
A fair appraisal ^  the Omibined Bomber Offeiwlve would include the 
fdl lowing major points#
(1) The years that have passed since the preporotlm of the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (1945) hove disclosed no new evidence to significantly
, : «
alter its conclusion that “A llied air power was decisive in the mm in Western 
iurcqm.“ The air suprmnacy of the Alt!#» mode possible the invcnlon of the Con­
tinent cmd keyed the ^ o r  to final victory. However, overstctemm# of the contri­
bution of air power imist be avoided. Nowhere is this caution mc®e c^ipropriate 
than In evolucding the occomplishmmts of the Condslned Bomber (Mfensive. Its 
successes md failures have to be considered within the lorgw framework of the 
totol A llied war effort. Nor Is A  is on o^er-the-fact |uc%mmt. It Is not pomible 
horn the evidence ovotlcble today to conclude that an attempt was mode by the 
Allies “ to win the wcr” by #roteg!c bombing, even though there were those who 
believed &*ch o course of action to be the wisest strategy to follow*
The success of m y bomblr^ campaign (of mmnive scale using m nvm tim ol
I
But even Hi Is judgment must be tentative, bfet until the vast #ore of 
informotion relating to the conflict between Germmy m d the USSR is mode ava il- 
dsfe for detailed scrutiny mn a more positive ossemmmt be mocb.
\lSSBSi Qvorall Report, p. 107.
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bomb#) i l  depmdmt upon the tomnege of bombs dropped md the target system that 
receives thmn# But these ere m t the m iy  two relevoi# fmtors* Additim oily, the 
elemmt of time must be Introduced into the equWlon, Bearing o il of these factor# 
in mind, it diouid then be recalled that the fu ll weight of the British end Âmerlem 
bomber offensive did m t materiali*e until late in the war* O f the total bomb 
tonn@@e d ro f^d  upon Ommmy, 72 per cent fe ll o#er 1 July 1944.^ The o n te c e ^ t 
21 per cent w«a spread over o five year psrlod, and, moreover, the period was one 
durit^ which, W  the meet pert, the technological odvon^mienti ond the defensive 
nwmure# ovolleèle fowcard the end of the war were cèdent from Allied crsenel#. Cm - 
sequently, the results mhieved from the bombing oompoi^ early in the war were 
neitWr mortal nor pwmonently dmncagir^. In this latter re ^ c t ,  the remorWsle in- 
gm uity of the Germans in repairing war domoim mW be token Into amount.
Furthermore, a rough anal>#ts of the target systmn reveals a very close 
Interrelation between the Ccmibined Bomber Offensive m d land and sea operations# 
The break-out o f the total bomb tmns#@ 0?y per cent again# q#ecific twget cate- 
gori®#) indicates that the prepondermce of the bombers* activities were “non-stro- 
tsgict**^
industrial 13
Trmsportotim 32
M ilitery/noval foe. 30
Cities 25
Total 15®
3lbW .,p . 71, % id .
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A ll of these foctors token together lead to an overall |u%nent that the 
Combined Bomber Offensive was cm Integral part of, mé not sepmrcèl# ham, the 
A llied i^ond strategy, m d that its succ^ees can be icW tlfied m much with Its 
“ cooperative** role os with its independent objoctlves*
(2) Beyond Hie name “Cmiblned Bon&m^  Offensive, ** there l i  little  to 
suggest that the British and ^ e r iw i  bomber op^otions were ever really combined. 
That they were complementary there is no doubt—but even in this re ^ c t  the Inter­
act im  could have been closer. What was laeklr^ was unity of commmd. tWd there 
been, first, unity, and second, firm eamrcise of unified command, obvious economlw 
of force and greater mncentrotion of effw t would hove been possible. As if wm, 
there were too many lines of influence and too much push ond pull from various 
pres»jre groups. This lack of direction from dbove served only to create a vemxiiR 
w hiëi wm cBnply filled by the personal convictions of Harris and Spootz, the leaders 
of the two operational commands, who, in turn, led their forces along the sepcrote 
paths of their own choosing* Without precise aims, there was too much latitude fmr 
interpretive strategic to be formed, but wUhout the assurance that their end-ob{eets 
would be coincident.
(3) In a somewhat negative vein, even the severest critics of the Com­
bined Bomber Ofrenslve mm be answered by quWioning what im uld have hcf^ened 
hW it not bew omrried out to the extent tW  it was* Granting that wch speculation 
Is perlKf® mstreme, there ore, neverthelws, some lAviow  derWctim# to be drown.
(o) With a relatively untouched industry (os in the tkiited Stated, the Germans
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would have been able to wage a war of logistics whose «foration ccmnot be estl- 
mated, (b) The destruction of the Lufrwoffe and Its w^»ortlng e ll indfostry under­
wrote the Invwlen of the Continent os a succ#sfol operation. Bed the Luftwaffe 
been able to eppoee OVERLORD In stre*%th, an liwaslon route throuÿi Italy might 
Wve becmie a necessity. (4  Tbe V - l and V-2 rocket programs preswted a threat 
of olmning proportions to the A llies. And of even greatm  ^seriousness was the work 
in progrm on the atom bomb. The elimination of these two thrwts by air attack 
denied Germany her rwnolnlng hc i^es of victory.
(4  The effects o f Wmblr^ upon German morale were {xobcbly over­
estimated, and, If this is true, the quantity of bomW dropped on German cities 
(25 per cent of the total) may hove been entirely dlqwr^ortlonate to the require­
ment. While the surface conclusion to be ckown from this would be to spook c riti­
cally of A llied intelligence, there is a more funcfomentol, but less precise, inference. 
It can be wggested that the Allies lost sight of the foot that the wear was not o th ir^ 
of itself but w«a beirqi fought for o political pui^ (%# outside of if. Thus the fxe- 
occupotion With moons was substituted for holding to the end. Whm the attainment 
of "victory® is the only real lim it imposed upon the con«foct of warfcare, one® be#n, 
it is almost certain Hint it w ill not end until o il of the countm have been played.
Hod this Inevitc&illty been uncforstood by the people who stcxted the wca*, they
^As it wm, the attacks c ^ lm t G#mon industry were a "three #eps 
fmrword, two stixT* bock® s ^ lr *  The cenëinatkm of Germmn rm m ur^^b im  in 
rwter#im% or reloccdion of industry «md the lock of A llied "follow-up** bombii^ 
was ovwoome In the end only by the d ie# weight of the attacks themselves.
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might hove refroWed.^
(5) Th#@ is o peoilicir cmgst connected with modem thinking «èwt 
the Confined Bomb# Offmslve. It Is o pm isfent, If sometkn# eoretully dis^lsed, 
them© of gu ilt. The bomb# offmslv©, so the thinking goes, did not win the wor, 
therefore. It wm bed. No one wceits to be cmocloted with o s tro t^y thot produced 
so much misery ond yet did not bring victw y. Curiously, this <#titud© does not 
seem to ottoch to reflection t ^ n  the bombing 0»oth fire roldl cmd otom bomb^ of 
Jopcm becmise the wm mm won without invoslon. Hence the bombing wm good#
This Is on odd twisting of voluei, because when the major bombings took ploce, 
icpcm wm then desperately close to the end md would probcèly hove succtm&ed
y
Without either m  Invoslm or the bombing. What seems to be cbsent from the 
thinking daout these phewmono (the bombings of Genncmy cmd Jcpon) 1$ the reali­
zation that they were but o port o f the whole q»ectrum of violence implicit In modern 
warfare# Were this to be more clecrly seen, th#e would be more ottentlm  givm  
to how worn con be ovol#d them hew they should be waged.
^odoy there it recognition that the bcmbli^ of cities is cè|ection<d>le— 
hence the odvococy of a "counterforce" strot^gr directed toward the annihilation 
of the en#ny*s m ilitary capability. But paradoxically, the people who today ore 
mo# likely to decry the bombing of G#m«m cities ere the some people who would 
have us possessed of only a handful of nuclear weapons to be used In vengeance 
attacks upon the og^essor*# c lt i# .
^How widespread this Imowlecfo# was at the time, if at a ll, »i on entirely 
d iff#ent matter.
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p o s r a ir r
If wo* IS OS Cloumwitz scys it isW on extension of politics by other meom®— 
then we must petforce choose ways of wcr that bear some relationship to the character 
of our politics* Political alms tlxxt or© grandiose «and high-blown produce war policies 
that are equally inflated and imuWtontlal. Throf^ fghout history this relationship hm 
not been particularly relevant becmise the static technology of wrnrf## imposed on 
upper lim it to the odiievcèle degree of violence—regardless of the irrespoiulbifity 
of political goals*
In World War II a break-through occurred and Hiefe existed an olterotlon 
of the old balcmce. It becmie possible for m ilitary might to run beyond political pur­
pose* Since then the trend has steeperwd eaqxwentially* Were our politics new to 
become so immoderate os to ascribe ev#i a taint of legitimacy to genocide, we Ixsve 
the genie in the W ttI# to do our bidding.
Should we bo able to retain a moderate and realistic political outlook, there 
remoli® hope that we cm find some way back down the lodd# toward m ilitary scmlty* 
One way to cfo this is to devote as much attention to devising, and speculating upon, 
post-wcr scenarios os w© in developing idem about how wars might stcrt.
The basic problem is not really a difficu lt one. It I* a matter o f making 
means fît ends* The real d ifficu lty is, of courw, in finding a way by which two 
k ^ ile ,  suqsiciom, msd very difrermnt societies con be led to identify common and 
reasondble goals. If this mn be done, Hie means th# i mmme true relevcmce. If 
we cemnot do this, the mwwqpences of failure me q^xwmit.
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